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ABSTRACT
A Case Study of the Contributions of the Special
Commission on the Reorganization of Higher Education,
Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
November 14, 1979 to June, 1980
(May, 1981)
James Joseph Dowd, B.S.E., Westfield State, M. Ed.,
Westfield State, Ed. D.
,
University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Dr. David Schuman
This dissertation provides an in depth study of the
activities and contributions of the Special Commission on
the Reorganization of Higher Education through the period
from November 14, 1979 to June, 1980. References have also
been made to events and activities taking place both before
and after the subject period.
The initial activities of the Commission received
particular emphasis in this study, because they set the
stage for later direction. I have carefully noted the types
and Quality of leadership which surfaced within the Commis-
sion, and their effects upon that body.
The importance of the time element has been stressed
on many occasions in the dissertation. The commencement of
the Commission's work took place amidst an aura of no apparent
worrv relative to the time span within which to work , but the
vi
last chapters of the dissertation indicate the frantic
haste with which the Commission tried to complete its work.
Forces which acted upon the Commission, both internal
and external, have been cited and reviewed. The interaction
of Commission members with their colleagues and with people
outside the Commission has been clearly delineated. The
relationship of the Commission with the Governor and the
legislature proved to be critical, and the dissertation
provides an accurate appraisal of the depth and sincerity
pertaining to that relationship.
I have been able to provide the essence of this case
study by means of firsthand observation of Commission
meetings, discussions with Commission members and staff,
review of notes, minutes and recordings of Commission meet-
ings, and a vast amount of reading.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this dissertation is to provide an in depth
study of the contributions of the Special Commission on the
Reorganization of Higher Education, Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts, November 14, 1979 to June, 1900.
The dissertation will examine the creation and sub-
sequent operation of the Commission. The pace of the
Commission's creation was a slow one, and the reasons for
that slowness will be looked at. The reasons are important
not only as they pertain to the formation of the Commission,
but also as they can be related to subsequent events.
The actions of the staff and members of the Commission
are worthy of close observation, and an assessment will be
made of those efforts as well.
The dissertation will provide a close look at the work-
ings of the executive and legislative branches of Massachu-
setts government, and show how both branches interact with
a Special Commission.
The dissertation will provide observations of what is
offered in general within public higher education in Massachu-
setts, and will show how the present systems of governance are
structured within public higher education.
1
2Educators will be shown in action, and the author will
take pains to show items which were initiated by educators
to enhance the work of the. Special Commission, and also to
show instances whereby the work of educators created obsta-
cles for the Special Commission.
The workings of power, the levels of leadership, and
the numbing effects of outside forces on the Commission will
also be recorded in this dissertation.
Finally, the dissertation will effectively record the
machinations, progress, regression and internal struggles
of a Commission charged with the reorganization of Massachu-
setts public higher education in a state which historically
has proved to be almost on the edge of paucity with regard
to the financing of public higher education, and whose
state legislature has numbered among its members several who
have seemed bent on destroying at least a portion of the
current systems of public higher education.
Many topics will be addressed in the dissertation, but
the principal thrust of the dissertation will be a case
study of the Special Commission, and all other topics will
be utilized solely as a means to a better understanding of
the Special Commission's work.
Of the outside forces referred to before, (and the
dissertation will show many of them) , none was more powerful
than the Massachusetts legislature.
The power of appropriative bodies is immense; in the
3case of the Massachusetts legislature, the power is awesome.
For example, several years ago a Massachusetts State
Representative (not now a current member)
,
was quoted on a
commercial radio station news broadcast around budget time
as follows:
"...and that begins next week when the college
presidents come in, and the Hammer of Thor lands
on them, and squashes some of them like the bugs
that they are." 1 Those are just the sentiments of one
former member.
Those sentiments, colorful as they are, indicate an
attitude common to many in the legislature which reflects a
disdain for certain agencies, and especially for those con-
nected with educational pursuits. Sometimes the disdain
gains awesome proportions.
To illustrate the last assertion, the Massachusetts
budget for fiscal year 1980 contained a provision (passed
by the House and Senate) that would have affected many
administrators within the Massachusetts State Colleqe
system. “ Specifically, Section 49 of House 6400 called for
the reduction in salary of any administrative (non-bargaining
unit) personnel who had an established salary of thirty
thousand dollars or more per annum as of July 1, 19 .
S
to
revert back to the existing salary of July 1, 1977 plus any
additional benefits which might have accrued from the pass-
age of Chapter 872 of the Acts of 1977.
4The specific provision 49, found in the budget's out-
side language, was disapproved by Governor King, but its
barbed implications for the State College system specific-
ally, and for public higher education in general, did not
give educators a comfortable feeling.
Part of the reason for the dissatisfaction of the
legislature with public higher education was based on the
action of the Massachusetts State College Board of Trustees
naming former Westfield State College President Dr. Robert
L. Randolph to a position on the Central Board staff after
he had left his position at Westfield State College. 3
In general, the latter part of 1978 and the early
months of 1979 found public higher education taking a verbal
beating from some members of the legislature.
The following quotes are representative of the legis-
lative feeling toward public higher education during the
time frame referred to above.
"The state colleges have been under fire because I
4don't think they can define their true mission."
"Fiscal autonomy is the fly in the ointment, that's
the problem... It gives them the green light to do whatever
they damn well please." 5
"...public higher education has not taken the
initiative to correct abuses, and until it does, it risks
losing fiscal autonomy." 5
Thus, one can see that the formation of the Special
Commission on Reorganization did not take place at a time
when the legislature exhibited kind feelings toward educa-
tors and education.
Not all members of the legislature, however, are
completely vindictive sorts. Fortunately, some are logical,
sharp-thinking and far-reaching in their thoughts.
It is easily perceived that the influence of the legis-
lature extends not only to the writing and passage of legis-
lation, and the acts of appropriation of monies, but their
real sphere of influence occurs when the legislation and
appropriations help to create an aura, a philosophy and a
mood that extends in beneficial ways to some agencies
,
and
causes difficult situations for others.
In recenu years, anyway, it is not difficult to detect
hov; the legislature felt about the financial suoport of
public higher education.
For instance, in the calendar years 1977-7S, Massachu-
setts was compared with all other states and the District of
Columbia, and ranked as follows:
Rank Category
6 Tax Revenues
51 Allocation to Public Higher Education
46 Appropriations per Student
47 State Public Higher Education and
Cost Index 7
Figures like those above seem incongruous when viewed
at a time when reorganization of Massachusetts education by
a Special Commission was being considered. Even though I
6have only taken a few selected items to show, it is clear
that the indicated magnitude of Massachusetts support of
public higher education is nothing to be proud of.
It is clear that the legislature holds awesome power.
And, much of this power is put directly into the House and
Senate Ways and Means Committees. But it is also clear that
the trend in Massachusetts has been a gradual but firm ero-
sion of funding support for public higher education. Thus,
that power of the legislature had not been used to support
public higher education in a positive way within recent
times
.
Can the legislature, then, be expected to have a
positive approach in dealing with public higher education in
Massachusetts?
My opinion is that as long as the legislature actively
holds the purse strings of the appropriations made each year
by that body to public higher education, and as long as it
continues to require that an agency cannot make internal
changes in its budget (within certain accounts) without
gaining the permission of either the House or Senate Ways
and Means Committee, the status of public higher education
will always be at a low level.
I am sure that my opinion is shared by many. In fact,
many objective newspaper reporters have covered the Massachu-
setts State House beat for years. Supposedly, their comments
reflect no bias, but only what they see and perceive. In a
7comment pertaining to the attitude and actions of the House
and Senate in the preparation of the FY 1980 Budget one of
those reporters
,
Don Ebbeling, stated "Massachusetts tax-
payers are becoming accustomed to this asinine and childish
behavior of our legislators. And we are all being injured.
Senator John Olver has described the working conditions
of the legislature as he saw them in June of 1979. "It's a
mean place. The atmosphere has been poisoned. Times are
bad
,
inflation is getting worse, and people are looking for
.. 9
a scapegoat.
In early 1980, Mayor Koch of New York City proposed a
reduction of nine million dollars in that city's share of
the cost of the CUNY nine community colleges. The reaction
brought fire. "Officials, asserting that the community
colleges were already seriously underfinanced, said that the
proposed budget cut, even if ameliorated by a tuition in-
crease, would lead to a serious curtailment of programs,
course offerings and student services." 10
In a report concerning public higher education in
Nebraska, Lyman Glenny felt that the legislature is capable
of coordinating the state higher education institutions in
Nebraska, 11 but in another report says that legislators look
at a higher education costs primarily in terms of students
1 ?
enrolled.
An ominous warning note sounds when Glenny comments
,
"Legislatures, accountable only to the electorate, need not
8and rarely do give reasons for particular appropriations in
any formal and specific manner.
Thus, in light of past results within Massachusetts
relative to public higher education support by the legisla-
ture, and cognizant of the attitude (past and present) of
some legislators towards public higher education, I again
strongly state that the legislative influence on public
higher education is of such a crushing force that it is by
far the most potentially devastating force to be directed
towards public higher education. Furthermore, I will show
in the dissertation that the legislature was truly the most
stultifying outside force on the Special Commission, and
that the Commission was literally haunted by the spectre of
the legislature through all of the 210 days of its existence.
Finally, it succumbed to the inordinate strength of the
Mouse and Senate. The record will show, however, that
actions of the Special Commission itself actually benefited
the assault on it by the legislature.
Other outside forces existed, although none possessed
the power of the legislature. These other forces would also
exert an influence on the Commission's work.
Massachusetts has a 3 to 1 ratio of private colleqes to
public colleges, and the leaders of the private colleges,
their trustees and their alumni showed immense interest in
the forthcoming reorganization and the formation of the
Special Commission.
9In addition to the ongoing battle of competition with
the private colleges, segments of public higher education
also have an active competition with each other. Thus,
students within the system, professors, alumni, current
board members (and the various public segments themselves--
university, state college and community college systems)
also comprised what could be classified as outside forces
as the Commission prepared for action.
The Board of Higher Education, the Executive Office of
Educational Affairs, and the Board of Education would also
have to be considered as outside forces. Any study by the
Special Commission would probably evaluate the roles that
these agencies play. Insofar as these offices all came
about as a result of the last major reorganization within
Massachusetts, the Willis-Harrington Study and Report 14
,
all
probably viewed the Commission as a possible agent of their
own demise.
Representatives of the media would certainly find them-
selves classified as outside forces also. Their portrayal
of the activities of the Commission would provide a critical
interface between the Commission and the world at large.
One of the most critical outside forces was time.
Although there seemed to be an abundance of that commodity
at the outset of the Commission's work, that situation did
not persist as the work of the Commission wore on.
There is no argument which would negate the fact that
10
the Special Commission had a tremendous potential. As this
dissertation progresses, it will be made apparent what the
true contributions of the Commission were.
My direct approach in preparing this case study of the
activities of the Special Commission on Reorganization has
consisted, and will consist, of the following:
1. Attendance at Commission and subgroup meetings.
2. Discussions with executive director and staff
members of Special Commission.
3. Discussions with members of Special Commission.
4. Review of notes, minutes, cassette recordings
and paper output of Commission and subgroups.
5. Review of work of previous Special Commission on
Reorganization, and review of all previous
reorganization plans.
6. Discussions with various members of the legisla-
ture .
7. Study of Commonwealth budgetary materials
covering the last several years.
8. Study of current educational institutions in the
Commonwealth and the workings of the systems to
which they belong.
9. Study of the Massachusetts position in comparison
to the other forty-nine states relative to the
magnitude of funding of public higher education.
10.
Vast amount of reading on many subjects including
11
governance, budget, reorganization methods, power,
management practices, marketing and many, many
others.
The author asks the reader to note the following points.
The terms Commission, Special Commission and Special
Commission on Reorganization will be used throughout the
dissertation to represent the Special Commission on the
Reorganization of Higher Education. The term full Commission
will be employed to distinguish the main body from either the
Boston subgroup or the Governance subgroup.
The term House will be considered synonymous with the
Massachusetts House of Representatives, and the term Senate
will be considered synonymous with the Massachusetts Senate.
The term Governor, unless otherwise designated, will
apply to Edward J. King.
Finally, the term Commonwealth will be synonymous only
with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in this dissertation.
CHAPTER I I
FORMATION OF THE COMMISSION: THE INITIAL MEETING
On June 26, 1979, provision was made (through a legis-
lative resolution) 15 for a Special Commission to investigate
and study matters relative to the evaluation and reorgani-
zation of public higher education in the Commonwealth. Of
great interest to me was the stated need within the resolve
for "improving the structure of public higher education in
the Commonwealth." 16 The resolve also set a mandatory date
for the receipt of the Commission's first report. Drafts of
possible legislation which would emanate from the Special
Commission were to accompany the first report.
The date of filing was set for December 5, 1979. Un-
fortunately, the first meeting of the Special Commission
took place on November 14, 1979, some 141 days after the
passage of the resolution, and only 21 days before the man-
dated initial report. As a matter of fact, the first in-
terim report of the Special Commission was given a publica-
tion date of June 30, 1980. (Some legislation resulting
from the Commission's work was produced in late spring,
1980) . This procrastination inherent in the late start
established a beginning of the Commission that was marred by
the lateness. If every available day of the Commission's
possible life had been utilized from the beginning of eligi-
ble time (June 26, 1979) until the actual end (June 11, 1980)
12
13
the Commission could have had a working life of 351 days
instead of 210. It is most interesting to speculate on what
might have happened had the Commission met for the addi-
tional days.
The chief reason for the late start should probably be
attributed to the failure of the Commonwealth's chief ex-
ecutive, Governor King, to make the majority of his ten
appointments until October 12, 1979. This delay was the
chief reason accompanying other circumstances regarding the
late start which cost the Commission an increase of up to
sixty-seven percent in working time.
The late appointments of the Governor were further
compounded by the fact that of the original ten appointed
by the Governor, three failed to compile positive attend-
ance records.
One never appeared, and was replaced in January, 1980;
one attended four meetings (the last one was February 21,
1980) and was replaced in May, 1980; one never appeared, and
was never replaced (thus causing a complete gap of one
possible spot)
.
The backgrounds of the gubernatorial appointees are
interesting to peruse. Some backgrounds indicated great
potential strength for the Commission.
The Honorable Foster Furcolo had served as Governor
of the Commonwealth from 1957 - 1961, and is regarded by
many as being the father of the community college system in
14
Massachusetts
.
George Hazzard had served as president of one of the
top private engineering schools in the East, (Worcester
Polytechnic Institute). The Honorable John Collins had
served as Mayor of Boston, and James Hammond was appointed
to serve on the 1979 Commission while concurrently serving
as Chancellor of the Massachusetts State College system.
Only one gubernatorial appointment to this Commission
had served on the previous Commission (formed in 1977) as
well. Dr. Francis Sherry was not an original appointee to
1977 Commission, but was named by Governor Dukakis to
fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of James Bailey.
Eight House members and four Senate members serving on
the 1979 Commission had also served on the 1977 Commission?' 7
Thus, the legislative members were well acquainted with the
Special Commission's purpose.
The Commission staff members appeared to be well
chosen for the task ahead.
Richard Hailer, Executive Director, had been inter-
viewed by the previous Special Commission, and had formerly
served as Assistant Secretary of Educational Affairs in
Massachusetts. A former Director in the United States
Peace Corps, Richard exhibited a great deal of serenity
throughout the entire life of the Commission, and probably
could be correctly deemed one of the most stabilizing in-
fluences during the period November, 1979 to June, 1980.
15
Two of the other staff members had also worked for the
previous Special Commission, and all of the additional staff
had previously been employed by, or served on, at least one
Commonwealth board or agency, so the apparent level of ex-
Pertise among the staff was high.
A great deal of practical experience was brought to the
Commission by the presence of Laura Clausen, Gregory Anrig
and Charles Johnson, the ex officio members.
(A list of the regular and ex officio members of the
1979 Commission, their titles (if applicable) and their
lengths of service will be found in Appendix B)
.
At this point in time, in spite of the lateness of the
appointments
,
and the resulting terrible time lag between the
potential beginning of the Commission and the actual incep-
tion, it would seem to the casual observer that the Comm-
ission might still have a chance of success.
However, it sometimes seems that previous experiences
leave lasting impressions. All levels of this present
Special Commission (staff, gubernatorial appointments,
legislative appointments) had at least one member who was
affiliated with the previous Special Commission. Therefore,
before examining the record of the current Special Commis-
sion, it would be wise to examine the record of the previous
Special Commission to determine what the circumstances of
its existence had been. An exhaustive search for official
minutes produced little result. The only available record
16
of the previous Commission was located in the office of the
current Commission. According to those records, the 1977
Special Commission held only three full meetings in 1973.
(The current Commission would hold eleven full Commission
meetings and eighteen subgroup meetings)
The first two meetings in 1978 of the previous Special
Commission were roughly four months apart, with the first
one taking place in May.
The second meeting, on September 13, 1978, found two
major items put into action.
First, the full Commission, at the request of Rep.
James Collins (Amherst)
,
voted to form an executive
committee .
^
Second, the executive committee was given two charges:
1* Prepare with the assistance of staff a document
describing the status of public higher education, and
mail to all Commission members for their review prior
to the Commission meeting of November 14, 1978.
2. Lay the groundwork for the job description of an
executive director to be employed by the Commission.
At the November 14, 1973 meetina of the full Commiss-
ion (the last full meeting of this Commission, incidentally),
no mention was made in the minutes of the meeting about any
document related to the then current status of public
higher education.
Instead, the executive committee reported that they
17
had met
,
formed a job description for the position of
executive director, and had posted that job description.
It was noted that approximately 130 applications had been
received. The Commission wanted to hire an executive
director, and asked that ten finalists be submitted to it.
Although the executive committee met several more
times, nothing came to fruition as a result of its work, and
the efforts of the 1977 Special Commission ended without
ceremony or completion.
The overall record of the previous Special Commission
was not impressive by any standards. And, in light of the
quantity of members and staff serving on the current Special
Commission who served on or with the previous one (at least
fifteen people are involved—if one counts those as well
with some limited interaction relative to the previous
Commission, the total number gets close to twenty) it is
important here to note the following:
1. Senator Boverini, Chairman of the current Special
Commission, also served as Chairman of the previous
one
.
2. Four members of the Senate and eight members of
the House, serving on the present Special Commission,
also served on the previous Commission.
3. Two staff members of the present Commission
served for the previous Commission.
The Governor was tardy in making his appointments4.
18
to the Commission.
Even prior to the first meeting of the current Special
Commission
, rumblings protesting reorganization were heard,
and, on other fronts, reorganization was being called for.
Many people felt that the thrust of public higher
education within Massachusetts lacked direction and coor-
dination, and these same people felt that public higher
education lacked overall coordination.
Special examples of items which were drawing the ire
of many included poorly constructed college and university
buildings, and charges of incorrect use of discretionary
funds by some of the presidents in the state college system.
For instance, on June 21, 1979, the state college
presidents came under a great deal of fire from the Massa-
chusetts Legislative Committee on Post Audit and Oversight
for "wrong" use of discretionary funds. 19
Then, approximately a month before the first meeting
of the Special Commission, the library at the University of
Massachusetts, Amherst, began to shed its bricks, resulting
in a temporary closing of the library. Even though the
reason causing closing was not primarily a function of the
University, the incident again found people looking criti-
cally at another example of failure in what people loosely
. 20
called higher education.
Conversely, and interestingly, at its August 29, 1979
meeting, the University of Massachusetts Board of Trustees
19
voted to strongly support the status quo of its operations,
and took the occasion to warn against any severance and/or
isolation of the Boston Campus from the University. (The
entire text is found in Appendix C.)
A close neighbor of Massachusetts, Connecticut, was
also doing a public higher education reorganization plan at
the same time as Massachusetts. The Connecticut Board of
Higher Education, under pressure from its legislature to
present a reorganization plan, planned to act on several
drastic and major reorganization changes within the state.
Many in Massachusetts, including some legislators, ex-
pressed great interest in the Connecticut study.
A quote from The Emerging State College seemed to
correctly refer to a condition which many people suspected
was rampant in Massachusetts. "...if higher institutions
of a system are permitted to develop without overall coor-
dination, the tendency is for various institutions to
compete for students, to duplicate expensive programs, and
22
to incur unnecessary building and campus expenses."
The Special Commission members would find themselves
studying many reorganization proposals that had been intro-
duced over the last few years. None had ever been put into
practice, and they all enjoyed another common factor as well.
All proposals called for major changes in Massachusetts
higher education. Obviously, all of the proposals reflected
a general feeling of dissatisfaction with the status quo of
20
current systems.
Senate Bill 1371, introduced by Kevin Harrington in
1976, called for the formation of a twenty-eight member
board of trustees to run the college and university system
of Massachusetts. 23 Under this proposal, the board of trust-
ees would have disbursing power of all system monies, and all
existing segments would merge into one. A post secondary
education commission would work with the board of trustees,
and would in effect, become the equivalent of an accredita-
tion agency of state government.
Harrington s plans called for five university centers,
and gave the board of trustees complete autonomy to manipu-
1^^-® funding. In addition, the Board of Higher Education
was to be absorbed by the post secondary education commission.
The proposed measure, as submitted by Harrington, also
allowed for student and faculty representation on individual
institutional councils.
House Bill 5756, first submitted to the legislature
by Governor Dukakis in April 1977, also proposed to abolish
the Board of Higher Education, suggested a Board of Over-
seers which contained among other members the Massachusetts
Secretary of Education and allowed for Advisory Commissions?^
A later version of the Dukakis Bill (by Secretary Parks)
suggested regional organization under a central Board of
„
25Overseers
.
Kermit Morrissey, as President of Boston State College,
21
in 1977 proposed that a single Board of Regents of twenty-
one members replace all present governing boards and the
Board of Higher Education. Morrissey proposed that the
state colleges stand alone. 2 ^
The fourth and last proposal that I will refer to here
is the Board of Higher Education proposal of August 31,
1979. 27
Under that proposal's direction, there would be six
separate boards under the supervision of a strengthened
Board of Higher Education, and the office of Executive
Secretary of Education would be abolished.
The dissertation will illustrate the intrinsic diffi-
culty that the members of the Commission experienced in
attempting to assimilate the above information.
Obviously, it was to prove just as difficult for the
Commission's staff to find the best manner of presenting
this voluminous material to the Commission.
This chapter will end with a survey of the first meet-
ing of the Special Commission. The meeting was held on
November 14, 1979. The date was especially meaningful, be-
cause it marked the span of exactly one year from the date
of the third and final full Commission meeting of the pre-
vious Special Commission.
The Senate members had the best attendance record for
the first meeting, with all members from that body present.
22
The House of Representatives delegation produced an eighty
percent attendance rate and three out of ten gubernatorial
appointees were missing.
The first meeting was fairly promising. The action of
the Commission resulted in Senator Walter Boverini being
elected Chairman, and Representative Frank Matrango being
elected Co-Chairman.
Then, in a move which allowed for integration of the
previous Special Commission's work, Richard Hailer was
appointed Executive Director of the Special Commission.
Finally, it was agreed that objectives dealing with a
final report of the Commission should be clearly delineated.
Before the first meeting adjourned, it was agreed that
heads of the various segments were to be invited to attend
future meetings in order to explain missions and goals of
their individual segments, both current and futuristic.
The next chapter will record the progress of the Com-
mission through its next twenty-eight meetings.
CHAPTER III
PRESENTATIONS TO THE COMMISSION
Any study of the Special Commission must not only con-
centrate on the Commission's efforts and accomplishments,
but also on the number of meetings that took place, and
their frequency, and the results of those meetings.
To show part of what I am referring to, the full
Commission met six times between November 14, 1979 and Feb-
ruary 14, 1980. The shortest period of time between any two
consecutive meetings was ten days. The longest period of
time between any two consecutive meetings was twenty-eight
days
.
From February 14, 1980 to June 11, 1980, the Commis-
sion met as a full group only five times, and in all but one
case, there v/as almost a gap of one month between consecutive
full Commission meetings.
It should be noted, in all fairness, that some eigh-
teen subgroup meetings were held, but I could not help
looking back at the dismal record of the previous Commission,
and noting the fact that according to available records that
I could find, only three full meetings were ever held by
that body, and everything else was directed to an executive
committee subgroup. (A member of the 1977 Special Commis-
sion told me in 1978 (September) that that person felt that
the progress of the Commission was critically slow, and even
23
24
expressed doubt that the leadership of the Commission had
actually wanted to get anything done.) Perusal of the
record of the 1977 Commission tends to bear out that doubt
of the 1977 Commission member.
However, the status of the Special Commission as of
December 6, 1979 appeared (on the surface, anyway) to be
cause for optimism. A course of action had been formed, and
a schedule was in the process of being formed whereby the
heads of segments and agencies would define the mission of
their segments and agencies for the members of the Special
Commission.
Prior to describing these special presentations in
specific terms, I will give an overview of the total presen-
tations .
First, no segmental or agency presentation was as
complete, as effective or as penetrating as it could or
should have been. Most of the presentations were made in a
way that suggested deep servitude to the Commission, a lack
of faith in what was being said, no ability to dominate the
atmosphere of the occasion, and an extremely defensive
attitude
.
Obviously, the attitude, the posture, and what the
U.S. Marine Corps called "presence" can make a decided dif-
ference in the overall assessment of how a Special Commission
will regard representatives of components of an educational
system. My impressions after observing the presentations
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to the Special Commission led me to believe that the Special
Commission members were not impressed or enthralled with most
of the presidential deliveries.
To digress for a moment, I feel that public higher
education in Massachusetts has suffered for many years be-
cause the hierarchy of the segments was reluctant to take
an active role in telling the legislature what was needed
(really needed) to effectively maintain and improve our
system of public higher education in the Commonwealth.
Abbs and Carey take the view that there is a vast
difference between a university president who is keenly
aware of a state legislature, and one who lets the state
legislature run the ship. it's quite apparent that few
presidents within the system have the clout to actively en-
gage in a battle with the legislature. (One of the excep-
tions to that statement could be the current president of
2 QHolyoke Community College).*"'
Abbs and Carey also state that a leader does not just
minister to organizational equilibrium, but gives specific
direction.^ 0 Little if any direction was exhibited by the
presidents and other presenters before the Special Commis-
sion. A lack of direction at the hearings might indicate
that it is not present otherwise.
The mechanics of the presentations may be summarized
as follows:
1. Main speaker appeared with one or more colleagues
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before the Special Commission.
2. A fact book concerning the institution/system was
prepared for the occasion and distributed.
3. Remarks were made by the president and/or col-
leagues .
4 . Visual presentations were made to augment the
speaker's material.
5. Questions from the Commission members were
answered.
The presentations were subject to physical and psycho-
logical constraints.
It was difficult because of some room layouts for the
presenters to even establish or maintain good eye contact
with the Commission members. The lighting arrangements were
most difficult, the slide shows were not able to be shown
with maximum clarity, and the images themselves were often
keystoned as well.
It is no wonder that after all presentations were de-
livered a general feeling of relief seemed to pervade the
room.
However, it would have been possible (with some ad-
equate planning) to overcome some of the inherent space
problems . David Schuman's axiom (repeated in lectures and
books) that "If you make the rules you win the game" would
be well used as a daily reminder by those who have to make
,
_
. 31presentations
.
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Of even more importance is the question— What good
did these presentations do the Commission?
The presentations of the segments of higher education
,
the Executive Office of Educational Affairs and the Board of
Higher Education took about a total of fifteen hours of the
Commission's time, and, in a linear time frame, were given
over a time span of seventy days.
So, after ninety-two days of potential activity, the
Commission had met six times, elected a Chairman and Co-
Chairman, elected an Executive Director, arranged for visits
by segmental and agency heads, and listened to (and watched)
the representatives of the Board of Higher Education, the
Executive Office of Educational Affairs, the Massachusetts
State College System, The Massachusetts Board of Regional
Community Colleges, Southeastern Massachusetts University,
University of Lowell and the University of Massachusetts.
The presentations deserve examination, even though the
format was pretty universal. All extolled the virtues of
the respective systems, and all lamented what couldn't be
done because of lack of money.
The presentations of Chancellor of the 3oard of Higher
Education Laura Clausen, and of Educational Affairs Secre-
tary Charles M. Johnson were given with full knowledge that
several reorganization proposals over the last few years
have suggested the ouster of both agencies. The current
time frame was no exception.
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The presentation of the State College System took on
a slightly different approach because the presenter.
Chancellor Hammond, was also a gubernatorial appointee to
the Commission. (No matter how objective Chancellor Hammond
was capable of being, and no matter how pure his intentions,
his participation as a presenter was marred because of his
involvement with the segment coupled with his membership on
the Commission. It was a most untenable situation for the
Chancellor, and a poor situation for the Commission.)
Although planning was alluded to in most presentations,
none utilized it as a subject more than the presentation of
Laura Clausen, Chancellor of the Board of Higher Education.
However, the need for long range planning never became too
serious a subject for the Special Commission until near the
end of its deliberations in May and June, 1980.
In contrast to the light treatment accorded planning
by the Special Commission much has been written on the sub-
ject by writers of public higher education policy and
practices. Some excerpts are listed here.
In the book Public Financing of Higher Education
,
the
Tax Foundation directors feel that institutions should
develop master plans based on regional as well as state
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needs, and Palola suggests planning ranges of 1-4 years,
5-25 years and 26-50 years.
^
Eut, it's tough to implement a master plan even if it's
possible to write one.
29
Etzioni, in 1963, pointed out that "fifteen and ten
years ago underdeveloped countries were formulating master
plans for their modernization. Fewer than one out of ten
were implemented even in part." 34
Master plans are easily violated, also. After the
occasion of a master plan in education for North Carolina
was short-circuited by political connection, one college
president in that state said: "The whole master plan is
going to be useless if it is clear that educational issues
are settled in the state legislature by the political
7
sprocess.
"
Finally, a master plan should not be viewed as a means
of saving money, but, rather, as pointed out in Berdahl
,
it
may be a means of increasing expenditures "...because of
bringing together needs in a clear comprehensive whole.
The new year officially opened for the Commission with
a meeting which featured a presentation of data concerning
the Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges.
The presenters were both former legislators. John Buckley,
interim president of the community college system, gave a
soft sell approach which quietly extolled the advantages of
the community college systems. David Bartley, President of
Holyoke Community College, followed with a hard sell
approach relative to the economic linkages of community
colleges with their surrounding communities. This observer
noted the uncommonly warm reception that these two presidents
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received from the legislators present, and both (especially
President Bartley) basked in the situation which allowed
them to make their presentations in very familiar surround-
ings. No other president or presenter fared as well. It
was prophetic because the old saying that "The legislature
takes care of its own" seemed to be working, a grim reminder
that this Special Commission was operating within a system
controlled by the legislature.
Four days after the Buckley-Bartley presentation, the
Boston Globe's Muriel Cohen wrote a comprehensive article
regarding the consolidation of Boston public colleges, and
the headline stated that it was considered "inevitable" by
some. (The outside forces were beginning to move.)
^
The meeting of January 14, 1980 dealt with many sub-
jects, and for the first twenty-five minutes was a rambling
affair. After mention and discussion of several subjects
such as building authorities, elimination of programs,
curriculum and evaluation of institutions. Mayor Collins
cautioned that the Commission not go in too many directions.
Dr. Sherry spoke up strongly in favor of subcommittees.
Senator D'Amico, in a prophetic move, suggested that the
Commission deal with Boston first. Discussion followed on
whether to take Boston first or not. At this point the
Committee moved into action, and began to talk about the
Boston situation.
Senator Boverini cautioned the Commission that if they
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don’t do Boston, people might say that they were ducking it,
and questioned if people might say that Finnegan, McGee,
Bulger and Atkins can reorganize without the Commission. 38
The rest of the meeting dealt with "getting the
Commission's act together," basically by agreeing to set up
subcommittees, and going in what the Commission members and
staff felt was a positive direction.
The meeting closed with three items that deserve re-
cording
.
1. Dr. Hazzard and Mayor Collins urged the Commission
to move with greater speed.
2. Chairman Boverini stated to the Commission that
even though he had been asked if the Commission could
meet every week, he had many other meetings to attend
dealing with many other subjects.
3. Again, Senator Boverini (along with Representative
James Collins and Senator D'Amico) stated that if this
Commission doesn't do something with Boston, someone
will.
On the evening of January 14, 1980, Governor Edward J.
King delivered his annual State Address, and the following
items within his speech were of particular interest.
"Of particular importance is reform of our Civil
Service system and elimination of waste and duplication in
our state colletes and universities. Two Special Commissions
are now reviewing these problems. (Next paragraph from
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original text has been omitted.)
Our public colleges have a tradition of academic ex-
cellence. We shall maintain this tradition, but in a way
which both student and taxpayers can afford.
We urge each Commission to report its findings and file
legislation for action in this year's legislative session.
The Governor's request could not be misinterpreted.
It was a call for quick action. The same request had been
made that afternoon by Commission members Hazzard and
Collins (John). Up to this point, the requests/admonitions
were ignored.
The last two meetings at which presentations were
given (Southeastern Massachusetts University and the Univer-
sity of Lowell on 1/24/80 and University of Massachusetts
on 2/14/80) were not marked by any noticeable changes from
the first presentation.
Between the two meetings, however. House Ways and
Means Committee Chairman John Finnegan publicly stated,
"It's clear we have more physical facilities for higher
education than we need." 40 Again, Chairman Finnegan was
showing that his assault on public higher education was
serious, and he showed that he was unafraid to send barbed
messages into the "enemy camp." A serious condition existed
which the Commission members largely chose to ignore —
Finnegan's remarks caused consternation among the Commission's
members, but the Commission's activities didn't seem to be
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bothering Chairman Finnegan at all. it raised serious
questions. Who was really in charge? Who had the clout?
Of all the presentation meetings, the last one
(February 14) was the most important, for it was at that
meeting that several important things occurred.
1* Janet Robinson was appointed to the Commission to
replace Wayne Budd.
2. Former Governor Foster Furcolo submitted a re-
organization plan of his own to the Commission.
3. A Boston subcommittee was formed, and the young
and enterprising Senator from Worcester, Gerard D'Amico,
was named Chairman.
4. A Governance subcommittee was formed, and Dr.
Francis Sherry was named Chairman.
This meeting closed with an upbeat feeling among the
participants, but two warnings of caution were given by
Chairman Boverini. He suggested a close relationship be-
tween the Commission, the legislature and the Governor, and
he again reiterated what had been said a couple of meetings
before— "If we don't do it (the entire reorganization
package) it's going to be done."
In the first part of his remarks, at the end of the
meeting. Chairman Boverini might well have been referring
to a quote that appeared in Berdahl ' s book on statewide
planning stating that any growth of cooperation between
higher education and government will depend on the avail-
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ability of a mechanism to encourage cooperation . ^ ^ Unfor-
tunately, the record will show that no real linkage was ever
established by the Commission with the legislature— a deadly
mistake
.
The second part of the Chairman's statement only bore
out what he and others had succinctly stated before. Plenty
of enemies existed in outside forces, and they meant business.
CHAPTER I V
NEW DIRECTIONS
This chapter will cover the total time span measured
from February 21, 1980 until March 27, 1980. However, in
order for me to effectively document the work of the newly
formed subgroups, and at the same time relate it to the
of the full Commission, I shall refer to three seoarate
time spans as listed below:
Span I February 21, 1980 to March 6, 1980
Span II March 13, 1980 (morning and afternoon).
Span III March 20, 1980 to March 27, 1980
Obviously, the Commission staff was at work for more
than the listed dates above, but I am using the dates of
meetings as benchmarks for the three time spans.
Before embarking on a study of the specific time spans,
I would like to interject a summary that could be of interest
to the reader. As of the date of the last meeting of the
Commission (February 14, 1980), the Commission had completed
its ninety-second day, and had met as a group for a total
of approximately twenty hours. This works out to about an
average of thirteen minutes per day. Common practice in-
dicates that any project normally exerts a tremendous amount
of excitement at the beginning of the endeavor. However, no
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welling of excitement seemed to be taking place among the
Commission members. The reader will recall that in Chapter
III I cited the failure of Chairman Boverini to want to meet
on a weekly basis. The implication of that attitude was now
beginning to take on a great importance. Meanwhile, people
on the outside watched.
. .and waited.
Time Span I
The newly formed Governance committee met on February
21, 1980. The first impression one would have felt at that
first Governance meeting was that much time remained to make
decisions. The initial pace of the meeting was slow, and it
was indicated that "at some point" the Commission wants to
42talk to national experts. The feeling of ample time pre-
vailed.
During the discussion. Governor Foster Furcolo made
me listen carefully when he qualified a statement with,
"...when the time comes if we ever get to the point of
making final recommendations...". And, Representative
William Mullins expressed anger and frustration during this
meeting, saying "We're spinning our wheels. Where the hell
are we going?"
These were early signs that the Commission was not
going to find its task easy. This was the ninety-ninth day
of the Commission's existence, and it was apparent that no
clear direction was being pointed out by the leadership.
During this first Governance meeting, Dr. Sherry
attempted to exert moderate control over the pace and con-
tent of the meeting.
However, the meeting was managed, to a great extent,
by the input of Laura Clausen, Gregory Anrig and Arnold
Friedman. Additionally, William Mullins kept inserting re-
flections upon the quality of effort and work of the trustee
of public higher education. Representative Mullins blasted
the past role of some trustees, and especially some former
trustees of Westfield State College. 43
Other suggestions were made during the meeting, and
while all were positive they served to keep the Commission
at a standstill while all were being considered. Some of
the suggestions offered are listed below.
1. Chancellor of the Board of Higher Education Laura
Clausen urged that the subgroup list objectives.
(Again, I point out that this suggestion was made on
the ninety-ninth day of the Commission's existence.
The reader will recall reading in Chapter II that a
call was given to formulate objectives governing the
final report of the Commission. As far as I knew
ninety-nine days after that first meeting, those re-
quested items had not been produced. Nov;, here was
the same call being given again)
.
2. Commissioner of Education Gregory Anrig suggested
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that a summary of all reorganization proposals be made,
and that the Governance subgroup focus on the differ-
ences between and among the proposals.
3. Arnold Friedman made the suggestion that the sub-
group meet with faculty and students, and wanted to
know why all of public higher education is not being
coordinated together instead of the present system of
competition among segments.
The meeting closed on one positive note as well as a
recurring frightening one.
First, some agreement finally surfaced when Governance
committee members agreed to study reorganization proposals
for the next meeting, and, after discussion, to give con-
sideration to evaluating the Board of Higher Education and
Secretary of Education as well as agreeing to bring in some
"experts" to aid the Governance subcommittee.
Second, and probably more important, a state of
reality was again stressed by Commission Chairman Walter
Boverini when he told the Commission members on the Gover-
nance subcommittee that something is going to happen from
within (the Commission) ^ or without. Both Senator Boverini
and Representative Mullins cautioned their Governance com-
mittee colleagues not to underestimate the power of the
House and Senate Ways and Means Committees.
A week after the initial meeting of the Governance
subcommittee. Chairman Gerard D'Amico met on February 23,
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1980 for the first time with members of the Boston sub-
committee. Six Boston centers of public higher education
were represented at this meeting, and the head of each
institution reacted as one would expect. Certainly, the
majority of the six heads were not too happy to speak of
specific merger plans. 45
Although Kermit Morrissey, the President of Boston
State College soon would be leaving that post to become
Assistant to Human Services Secretary Charles Mahoney, he
testified relative to reorganization of public higher
education. His stated preference was to have a statewide
reorganization take place first, and then have a Boston
reorganization take place.
Other comments from the assembled presidents were
quite parochial.
President Shivelev of Bunker Hill Community College
extolled the virtues of Bunker Hill's Learning Center,
terming it the "most extensive teaching-learning center in
this country." His colleague. President Haskins of Roxbury
Community College launched a heated attack on remaining
color policies within the Commonwealth, and, in a statement
backed up by statements from Representative Mel King, said
that his facilities needed better access as well as improve-
ment because his people were poor.
President McKenzie of Massachusetts Bay Community
College praised the role of his institution, and sounded in
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no way receptive to any proposed merger.
President Nolan of the Massachusetts College of Art
also expressed resistance to reorganization when he called
for the preservation of the independence of the Massachu-
setts College of Art, and the need for separate laboratory
facilities
.
The only two presidents who discussed any merger plans
on any type of a positive note were President Morrissey and
Chancellor Corrigan, with Morrissey suggesting a merger of
University of Massachusetts/Boston State and Massachusetts
College of Art and Corrigan stating that any merger has to
be approached cautiously.
Representative James Collins queried the presidents
about the possible savings to be gained by consolidation.
Almost all the presidents responded in a highly ferocious
(but civilized) manner that money is important, but should
not be the main question.
Senator D'Amico interjected, at this point, a statement
offering opportunities for massive input to the Boston sub-
group and emphasized the importance of bringing all facts
about Boston forward so that full disclosure can ensue.
D'Amico was pleased to suggest that this Boston sub-
committee forum provided an excellent opportunity for con-
stituency groups to make their feelings known to the Commis-
D'Amico strongly stated that we (the Commission)^ are
sion
.
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prepared to reject any attempt at any level to circumvent
the work of this subgroup until as much data as possible
has been collected. I feel positive that this statement
was made with less actual certainty than was implied.
Senator D'Amico had to know what was happening with outside
forces, and so this statement was unnecessary.
Another false note of optimism was introduced by
Representative James Collins. He seemed to think that the
work of the Boston committee would be quick to bring to
finality, because he indicated in his remarks that in terms
of a final report, "maybe in a month." it's important to get
^ bi-P picture of what's going on in Boston.
The meeting closed on a positive note.
A motion was passed to visit all Boston campuses with-
in the month of March.
Commission Executive Director Richard Hailer exhorted
the Commission to ask only important questions on their
visits
.
And, in a concession to Dr. Hazzard's zeal for moving
right along. Senator D'Amico noted that "President Hazzard
keeps us on the move." 47 It is important to note yet
another warning from Dr. Hazzard.
The Boston subgroup held one more meeting (March 6,
1980) prior to the full Commission meeting of March 13th.
Two community colleges were toured, Roxbury and Bunker Hill.
Both visits allowed student, faculty and administrative
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leaders to plead for their respective colleges. At Roxbury,
Representative Mel King decried the political aura sur-
rounding any decision regarding Roxbury Community College.
However, no novel ideas were generated at either site, so
the most obvious advantage of the Commission visit was to
gain insight into what Bunker Hill and Roxbury were like.
Time Span II
The seventh full Commission meeting of the Special
Commission was held on March 13, 1980 at the University of
Massachusetts/Boston. Only six members of the Commission
plus the Commissioner of Education, his deputy and the
Chancellor of the Board of Higher Education were in attend-
ance for this meeting. A seventh member of the Commission
appeared less than thirty seconds before the end of the
meeting, although he was later listed as present.
The mood of the meeting could be described as both
lighthearted and apprehensive at the same time. The
apprehensiveness came about because of the rumor that a
number of students were going to stage a march that day,
and some members of the Commission felt that their meetinq
would become one of the stopping points of the students.
The lightheartedness sprang from the conduct of the meeting.
Early in the meeting. Commission member Arnold Friedman
asked if there were any cooperation among the segmental
43
building authorities
, State College System and State College
Building Authority. Trustee John Cataldo replied that there
was as much cooperation among segmental building authorities
as there was among trustees. This answer drew a big laugh.
The mood prevailed throughout the testimony of Messrs.
4 8Cataldo and Stuart, and probably accounted for the lack of
substantive questions asked of the two gentlemen.
4 9The Dover Project was brought up by Mr. Friedman,
but any serious inquiry into the full nature and philosophy
of the project never materialized.
A planned appearance by a Harvard professor, who had
been scheduled to speak on the subject of enrollment pro-
jections, never materialized
.
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While the meeting moved at a very slow pace to com-
pletion, two reports were presented to the Commission. Dr.
Francis Sherry reported on the progress of the Governance
subgroup, and promised that everyone would have input.
Senator D'Amico reported on the progress of the Boston sub-
group, and repeated the intention of the committee to visit
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all six Boston public higher education campuses.
The meeting finally started to steer in a fairly
serious direction when Executive Director Richard Hailer
took the occasion to mention key areas for the Commission's
consideration
:
Energy
Financial Aid
Capital Outlay
Student Services
Five-Year Plan
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Richard Hailer also mentioned that the staff members
were getting phone calls telling them to expedite the Drocess.
(No identities of the callers were disclosed.)
During the discussion led by Dr. Hailer, Chancellor
Clausen stated that she hoped to be able to refine data on
population projections by May, 1980. This would prove to
be a date too late for all practical purposes.
The importance of timely planning was accentuated
when Arnold Friedman, on this 120th day of the Commission's
existence, asked for information about other state systems.
The reply was made by Dr. Hailer that only partial reports
were available.
Mr. Friedman (with the agreement of Drs. Sherry and
Hazzard)
,
stated that he felt that the Commission was getting
into the study of too many intricate details. Both he and
Senator Olver requested information on what other states were
doing
.
The meeting ended inauspiciously
.
On the afternoon of March 13, 1980, the Boston sub-
group held its scheduled meeting at the Harbor Campus of the
University of Massachusetts. Chancellor Robert Corrigan and
President David Knapp led the delegation of University of
Massachusetts/Boston faculty and administrators who were
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present to provide information. As he did in the first
Boston subgroup meeting. Chancellor Corrigan emphasized
that merger of some Boston institutions could be a possibil-
ity. Other members of the administration, faculty, staff
and students contributed items to the Commission members.
Throughout the first part of the meeting, the shouts
of marching and protesting students could be heard, and it
was evident by the sudden appearance of what seemed to be
security personnel that some students wanted access to the
meeting and to the Commission, and that access was not to be
granted easily or immediately.
Finally, in a move that could have (and should have)
been granted immediately, the students who had participated
in the march were allowed to speak to the Commission. Their
subject was a plea for increased quality of Commonwealth
education. The remainder of the meeting was devoted to
specific admissions data pertinent to Boston State and the
University of Massachusetts/Boston.
The meeting ended on the afternoon of the 120th day.
The Commission did not know it, but only ninety days of
meaningful existence were left for it.
Time Span III
Additional meetings of the Boston subgroup and
Governance subgroup were held in March, 1980.
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The March 20, 1980 meeting of the Boston group was
held at Boston State College, and the thoroughness of prep-
aration by Boston State for the Commission visit matched the
thoroughness of the Boston State College President's Report
mentioned in Chapter II. 52 The meeting provided a forum
which allowed expansion of the college traits first pre-
sented at the initial Boston subgroup meeting.
Dr. Rothermel
,
a Boston State faculty member,
^
2 began
the forum by noting demographic facts unique to Boston State,
such as the fact that about half of the students at Boston
State apply only to that institution, and almost half of the
students come right from Boston. He was followed by other
speakers who spoke on specific college programs, including
54cooperative education and teacher education, including
involvement in the National Teacher Corps program.
55Dr. Carl Cedargren blasted the unfounded statements
that have been cited relative to Boston State. He bemoaned
the situation that would occur if Boston State were elimin-
ated, such as the probable loss of the opportunity for
thousands of students to attend a four-year college. Dr.
Cedargren took great umbrage at the proliferation of apparent
facts generated by UMass/Boston in an attempt to show that
UMass/Boston could absorb Boston State. Dr. Cedargren closed
his remarks with the suggestion that UMass/Boston be absorbed
by the State College System, using differences in per student
cost as one aspect of his assertion.
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Wear the end of the meeting Senator D'Amico told the
assemblage that his subgroup would be back to Boston State.
A particularly significant moment was reached during
the proceedings when subgroup Chairman Senator D'Amico was
asked by a member of the audience if the full Commission
could override the recommendations of the Boston subgroup.
Senator D'Amico replied in the affirmative, and further
indicated, m a very prophetic way, that the General Court
could if it wished, override the recommendations of the full
Commission
.
The meeting closed with many impassioned pleas to
leave Boston State College as it was.
The same day found the Governance subgroup meeting
also. It was the second meeting for the group, and marked
the end of a period of thirty days since that group's first
meeting
.
During the time between meetings, Commission subgroup
members had been expected to read and evaluate various
reorganization proposals that had been presented for their
review. Janet Slovin was asked to review the proposals
(listed in Appendix D) for the Governance group. Much of
the meeting was redundant in that the self-study material
assigned the Commission members was really only repeated in
its original form during the afternoon.
In my opinion, much of the time of this meeting could
have been spent more wisely.
The material for discussion could have been organized
much more succinctly; in fact, had the material been pre-
pared for discussion in a much better and more orqanized
fashion, it might have been possible to give this material
to Commission members so that the material was clearly
understandable in its printed form.
But, that was not done. Instead, much of the valuable
time of the Commission was taken by participation in a
poorly organized session.
The course of the meeting was choppy, with much dart-
ing back and forth from subject to subject.
It seemed to be a situation where the main theme of
the Commission kept being diverted into small and tenuous
channels
.
The meeting closed with a discussion of budget pro-
cesses and fiscal autonomy.
The reader will remember that I cited the vast impor-
tance of the legislature-controlled budget in the Intro-
duction to this dissertation. At that point in the disser-
tation, I pointed out that budgets created philosophies--
and, some of the philosophies created problems.
(As I observed the Commission at work, I really had
no assurance that all of the members really understood
budgets. Hundreds of volumes have been written about
budgets and budget processes. I felt that required reading
for the Commission should have been 'Vildavskv ' s text The
•19
Politics of the Budgetary Process
.
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However, the Commis-
sion never dug too thoroughly into the subject of budgets,
nor did they ever really address the fundamental aspects of
fiscal autonomy.)
Appendix E contains some goals and objectives for the
Governance subgroup.
The 134th day of the Commission's life saw the Boston
subgroup hold its fourth March meeting at a double location—
Massachusetts College of Art, and Massachusetts Bay Commu-
nity College.
The visit to the Massachusetts College of Art drew
attention to the singularity of the institution, and many
students gave impassioned pleas for the preservation of the
school
.
In my opinion. Representative Mel King contributed
the only item which made the meetina worthwhile, the only
criterion for the Commission to use in laying out the future
of higher education, in spite of pressure from the Governor
and legislature to save money and consolidate. He urged the
students at Massachusetts College of Art to mobilize all the
students in Boston in order to impress the Commission and
the Governor and the legislature with the importance of the
need to preserve quality education and unique education in
Boston.
When the group visited Massachusetts Bay Community
College, Senator D'Amico broached the proposal of a greater
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Boston Community College—one that would have several
campuses. The reaction to his suggestion was less than
positive. This suggestion only proved to be one more thing
to keep many public higher education members from supporting
the Boston subgroup or the full Commission.
During the meeting Senator D'Amico stressed that he
was subjected to forces all the time urging consolidation of
the present behemoths of the public higher education system
in Massachusetts.
He claimed that the Senate Ways and Means Committee,
House Ways and Means Committee, Governor, and many newspaper
writers and editors were taking up the banner for consoli-
dation.
The general tone of the meeting described Massachu-
setts Bay Community College as a unique place to provide the
services which it was able to provide.
President McKenzie chided the members of the Boston
subgroup who were absent, and strongly urged that the
governance of the entire state be worked out prior to the
Boston reorganization.
Summary of visitations:
All of the visitations were conducted by the members
of the subgroup in a slightly defensive manner, and in a
couple of instances the manner was quite defensive.
The quantity of representation of the Boston subgroup
was never what it should have been at any one meeting.
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Most of the visitations consisted of a tour, and then
a dialogue between the Commission and the members of the host
institution
.
The majority of dialogue generally consisted of
parochial arguments why the respective institutions being
visited should not be closed, or merged with others.
Senator D Amico
,
who chaired all of the Boston sub-
group meetings, divided his time in three ways while conduct-
ing the informational meetings.
1. He alluded many times to the fact that outside
forces were acting on the Commission to urge faster
action, and he constantly referred to the real world
political situation that was shaping the Commission's
actions
.
While speaking at Massachusetts Bay Community College,
Senator D'Amico said that he personally preferred to
move more slowly in his deliberations, but the spectre
of the House and Senate Ways and Means Committees
caused him and the Commission to move faster than he
desired
2. He acted as the chairperson who directed activ-
ities, and spent much of his time keeping track of
those who wished to speak to the Commission, and spent
a great deal of time listening to those people.
3. A great deal of time was spent in explanation of
why this subgroup of the Commission was looking at
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the Boston situation. This put the Commission in the posi-
tion of almost apologizing for its presence. Senator
D'Amico's engaging manner served him in good stead during
these visits, because both the people being visited and the
visitors reflected a great deal of the anxiety caused by the
sensation of outside forces getting ready to interfere.
CHAPTER V
OUTSIDE FORCES INTENSIFY EFFORTS TO CIRCUMVENT COMMISSION
This chapter will describe the meetings and activities
of the Special Commission from April 3, 1980 to May 15, 1980,
or from the 141st day to the 183rd day. The terminal date
of the chapter also marks the completion of six months of
official existence of the Commission.
The Special Commission was running out of time. The
early delay was proving costly, more costly than anyone
could have predicted, and the calendar and clock inexorably
ground on. Outside forces previously alluded to grew more
ominous and impatient, but the Commission continued to move
at an extremely slow pace. This chapter will record some
of the important (and not always beneficial events) that
took place within the time frame referred to above.
1. During this time period, the replacement of the
Honorable Foster Furcolo as a Commission member was effected.
The resignation of Foster Furcolo represented a dramatic
moment for the Commission, but most failed to realize its
full implications. One of the ostensible reasons for the
departure from the Commission of Governor Furcolo was that
he was not able to continue on the Commission because of the
strenuous demands of Commission work on his time. In actual
53
54
happening, the months of April and June, 1980 found Governor
Furcolo giving most freely (and charitably) of his time to
educational institutions, showing that the reason alluded to
above was only an illusory one.
Certainly, an astute civil servant and realistic
political figure such as Foster Furcolo probably sensed the
final outcome of the Special Commission's quest long before
it actually took place. My personal theory is that Governor
Furcolo recognized the inevitable, and left. Events which
followed seem to lend support to the theory. 58 it was a
major mistake for the Commission to have set the stage for
Governor Furcolo ' s departure. It was a huge tactical error
for the Commission (and the Governor) to have let his depar-
ture go without an attempt to convince him to stay.
2. The next major event was the introduction of House
6200, the budget document of the House, with its outside
language concerning reorganization. This document accentu-
ated the checkmate-in-progress situation applied by the out-
side forces. Its presence quickly led to an evaluation of
techniques by the Special Commission. However, no change in
tactics was noticed on the Commission's part. Thus, without
a countering defense by the Commission against House 6200,
the onslaught of the House Bill was intensified.
3. The third major event was the visit to the Commis-
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sion by Governor Edward J. King. In a visit which was
supposed to indicate support for the original purpose of
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the Special Commission, only the most ingenuous members of
the Commission could have found any hope in the Governor's
message. The Governor's visit was one that the Commission
would never forget. He left only devastation after his
visit.
4. It had become very clear by this calendar date
that the enemies of the Commission had been clearly identi-
fied. Concurrently
,
the course chosen by the Commission
members had not produced any positive results.
a. The biggest enemy of the Commission was time.
b. The second enemy consisted of outside forces
that would have been happy to supersede the Com-
mission. Some of these forces have been identi-
fied up to this point, and others will be identi-
fied in subsequent chapters.
c. The third enemy of the Commission was ... itself
.
I offer the identification of the third enemy not
in a deprecating sense but in an objective sense.
The Commission members, up to this point, had not
displayed a massive show of unity. Because of this
lack of cohesiveness, it made the idea of circum-
venting the Commission much more possible than it
might have been on November 14, 1979. In addition,
no major attempt had been made to link the work of
the Commission to a thrust of the legislature.
The Commission was, effectively, staying too inde-
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pendent. Thus, without a large and powerful
legislative base on friendly terms with the Com-
mission, and without the active and full support
of the House and Senate Ways and Means Chairpersons
as well as the Governor, the struggle became much
more difficult.
The chapter will be divided into three segments.
Span I April 3 to April 10, 1980
Span II April 17 to May 8, 1980
Span III May 13 to May 15, 1980
Time Span I
The first major item discussed at the April 3, 1980
Governance meeting was the lack of a coordinated system of
collecting information relative to public higher education
in Massachusetts. (There shouldn't have been a lack because
current statutes do mandate the collecting of data by the
Board of Higher Education. However, neither a system of
collection nor funds to support that system then existed.)
The topic led Arnold Friedman to call for coordination.
Dr. George Hazzard questioned the need for planning
and coordination, though, when he asked what good it did to
bring up those subjects for discussion when it was evident
the legislature was the boss. His sentiments were echoed
by Senator John Olver, who cautioned that an idealistic
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system might not work, even when it was a well-planned one,
because individual institutions have their champions. No
answer to Dr. Hazzard's question was offered that day, but
the events of June 10, 1980 provided an all-encompassing
answer although a belated one.
Janet Slovin attempted to disseminate a vast quantity
of information to the Commission members relative to dealing
with the question of segmental representation on the board
of higher education, the concept of Divisions of Continuing
Education and the question of planning and program policies.
fairness, the task was much too huge for either any
one person, or the method used. Thus, the important value
of information was lessened by the slow and cumbersome
approach used.
During this meeting, the chairperson, Dr. Sherry,
stated that the committee should have its final report by
September . This optimistic assumption led to two others.
First, "I think it's safe to assume that the life of the
Commission will continue until its work is done." Second,
Dr. Sherry suggested that the Governance committee make
orderly plans, using as the rationale, "We've got plenty of
time .
"
The meeting terminated shortly afterward.
At about the same time of this April 3, 1900 Gover-
nance meeting, University of Massachusetts President David
Knapp was addressing the issue of reorganization in a paper
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addressed to the Long-Range Planning Committee of the
University of Massachusetts Board of Trustees, (and one that
would be forwarded to the Special Commission if the trustees
approved.) One of the most interesting aspects of the paper
called for (if the Special Commission chose to do so) action
bY the Special Commission relative to requesting detailed
plans from segments within sixty days of the request. Using
^ realistic timetable of a total of ninety days from the
time of the Knapp Report to its possible adoption by the
trustees and the Commission, the request to the segments and
the full time limit allowed for answering by the segments,
this would have seen final action on this single suggested
phase by the first of July, 1980, a date we now know would
have been too late.
The other most interesting aspect of the Knapp Paper
(based upon a planning process between the Boston Campus
and the University Administration) is that Boston State and
the Massachusetts College of Art would both, by inference,
be absorbed by the University of Massachusetts, Boston.
The report states that the Special Commission could con-
struct a configuration of public higher education institu-
tions in the Boston area that could include:
1. The University of Massachusetts at Boston as the
one four-year and graduate institution of higher
education expanded to include...
2. ...the current Massachusetts College of Art as a
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distinct unit.
3.
...additional and/or enlarged university level
baccalaurate and graduate programs adequate to serve
the appropriate student populations in the Greater
Boston Area.
The April
,
1980 issue of The Massachusetts Teacher has
a comprehensive article on Massachusetts Public Higher
Education Reorganization
, which makes the following obser-
vation— "If reorganization cannot be effected in a program-
matically sound manner, there is the danger that it will be
imposed on us through budgetary fiat in the Ways and Means
Committee. That would be the worst scenario of all."^
The feelings suggested by the article in The Massachu—
Teacher took tangible shape with the passage of House
6200 through the Massachusetts House of Representatives.
The budget bill contained outside language related to major
public higher education reorganization, and was due to be
released to the public sometime during the day of April 10,
1980. On this date the Special Commission held a full
Commission meeting.
The Commission members patiently sat through rather
lengthy presentations dealing with educationally oriented
topics which were given by Dr. Francis Keppel and Reverend
Michael Walsh, S.J. . Again, patience reigned as reports
from the Governance and Boston subgroups were presented.
(In his report. Senator D'Amico predicted a final Boston
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subgroup report four to five weeks after April 17, 1980.)
Then, and only then, did the Special Commission ad-
^r®^s the issue of the House budget. Several statements
were issued with much fervor.
1. Senator D'Amico expressed great fears about the
reorganization process.
2. Representative Matrango very perceptively stated
that the House had a "potentially evil" budget to work
on that was based upon the Ways and Means Committee
recommendation
.
3. Laura Clausen added that she would not think too
highly of any attempt to circumvent the Commission.
The Commission discussed a motion presented by Dr.
Hazzard. Dr. Hazzard wished to have all capital outlay
expenditures held until the Commission (around September)
makes its preliminary report. The original motion was
kneaded (and greatly weakened) by a motion gaining the unan-
imous support of the Commission that cited its opposition
to any FY 1981 budget language that would preempt the Com-
mission's mission. Letters would be sent to the Governor,
Speaker and Senate President.
One Commission member, who did not wish to be quoted,
said later that the Commission should have demanded the
appearance before it of Chairman John Finnegan at that point.
In fact, stated this member, the Governor, and House and
Senate Ways and Means Chairmen, should have been "very
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strongly" requested to attend the opening session of the
Commission on November 14, 1979
.)
During the discussion of the latest House Ways and
Means maneuver. Senator John Olver cautioned the group that
the Chairmen of the Ways and Means Committees may not listen .
The advice was sound, but undoubtedly did not penetrate as
effectively as it should have. The Commission at least
recognized the devastating implication of H6200, but did
nothing to change course in order to adapt to this threat to
the need for the Commission's existence. (A concise descrip-
tion of both the contents of House 6200 and the ramifications
of its final passage in the House will be found in Appendix
K.)
Time Span II
Thus, the first meetings to take place after the
House had resolved its particular budget presentation had
to have been influenced heavily by that House action.
Taking the Governance subgroup meeting of 4/24/80
first, the subject of the recently passed House Bill 6200
did come up. First, Commission Chairman Walter Boverini
opened the meeting by commending Commission member Arnold
Friedman for his editorial entitled "How to Reform State
Colleges." 66 Boverini then told the Commission that the
message of House 6200 was "to expedite", and the Chairman
said that "nothing is final." He also said "I would never
Chairman of a moot Commission."
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Boverini stated that after this meeting, it will be up
to the Commission members themselves and the staff to sit
down and stop listening and start doing some talking. He
felt sure that when the Governor comes he would reinforce
those feelings. He told the Commission that although he
decried the process of using the budget to implement reorga-
nization, the whole budget process could be completed within
five weeks, so that something (perhaps an interim report)
has got to be produced by this Commission.
John Olver urged input from the Commission prior to
budget approval. George Hazzard questioned if the Commis-
sion members could, in fact, agree on general principles.
Dr. Singer suggested that an incomplete plan would be better
than none.
At this point the discussion seemed to be heading in
a direction which could lead to a partial or interim report.
Arnold Friedman, however, was staunchly opposed to any plan
that might be considered to be poorly conceived, or that
would have to circumvent the public hearing process in order
to gain implementation. He stated that he would rather have
House 6200 than to be forced to submit a poor proposal.
Chairman Boverini suggested using the Boston subgroup
recommendation, stonewalling, and standing solidly behind
the Boston proposal. He said that the Commission would win.
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Before turning the chair over to Dr. Sherry, Boverini said
to continue as though nothing happened—the Governor will
probably tell you the sane thing on May 8th. He also said
that "I might get the Speaker and the President to come
down and speak also before our group." The advice to con-
tinue as though nothing had happened was bad advice if the
Commission was to make any real progress. its present
course, if continued unchanged, did not guarantee success.
The assertion that the Speaker and President might accompany
the Chairman was, infortunately
,
made without prior assur-
ances from the parties referred to.
Dr. Sherry, upon assuming the chair, directed the
attention of the Governance subgroup members to the first
item on the agenda, a review of House 6200. This suggestion
met with immediate opposition from several members. Repre-
sentative Iris Holland railed against the Governor's libby-
ing for the budget. Arnold Friedman, enjoying one of his
most forceful meetings said, "I say to Hell with it (House
Bill 6200) at this point." He also said the only way that
he would consider a Finnegan plan would be if Finnegan sub-
mitted his plan to the Commission and not to the Ways and
Means Committee.
With fighting words, Robert Spiller echoed Mr.
Friedman's feeling, and introduced a few of his own. He
ended his remarks with, "We either have a Commission or we
do not have a Commission."
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Needless to say—Review of H6200 was not considered.
The next section of the meeting was devoted to discus-
sions pertaining to collective bargaining, salaries, and job
descriptions. The discussion, and presentation of material,
was slow and cumbersome, and an observer could only feel
that it might be more prudent for the Commission to move a
little faster. Secretary Johnson did bring out one inter-
esting point prior to the end of the discussion in relation
to the subject of collective bargaining. He stated that all
plans and all preliminary bargaining are moot if an under-
standing is not available with the executive branch.
After the discussion of collective bargaining procedure,
a recess was taken. When the meeting was recalled to order.
President John Buckley presented a plan of reorganization de-
veloped by the Board of Regional Community Colleges. He
also suggested that the Commission do something as quickly
as possible. He warned that if the Commission does not re-
spond in some way before the Senate acts upon the budget,
this Commission is apt to be irrelevant. (Secretary Johnson
also issued a warning during this meeting—The Commission
has to interact with the Senate and House.)
A short time later during the meeting, the talk swung
to how the Governance subgroup would conduct its next
meetings. This discussion used up between ten and fifteen
minutes, and was completely unnecessary. It remains a
complete mystery to me how Commission members could have
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allowed themselves to flounder aimlessly when it was so
cr ^^-*-ca^ f°r them to do something positive.
Finally, the meeting began to degenerate at the end.
Members became boisterous, and no firm control was exhibited
from the chair. Somehow, amid all the growing din, several
things were resolved as items for the future:
1. A plan would be developed for Boston.
2. A plan would be developed showing strong central-
ization, and then a plan would be developed showing
effects of decentralization.
3. Union representatives and students would be issued
invitations to appear before the Governance subgroup.
4. The staff would work on plans.
Now let us move on to a consideration of the three
Boston subgroup meetings of April 17, May 1 and May 6, 1980.
In contrast to the prevailing indecisive approval to problem
solving exhibited by the Governance subgroup at its April
24, 1980 meeting, the Boston subgroup spent three meetings
solidifying its data bank relative to the services and
opportunities offered (and needed to be offered) by the six
Boston institutions of public higher education. Students,
faculty and staff again took part in the discussions with
the Boston subgroup, and the subgroup got closer to the
point of issuing its preliminary report.
The May 6, 1980 meeting was the eighth meeting of the
Boston subgroup. There would be five more.
6 6
(The Commission received a message from the Board of
Trustees of Southeastern Massachusetts University which was
dated (lay 6, 1980 and which strongly lobbied against one
central board which would govern all of public higher educa-
tion in Massachusetts.)
The Governor arrived at the full Commission meeting of
May 8 , 1980 alone. Senator Boverini's hope that the
Governor would be accompanied by the Speaker and the Senate
President was unfounded.
His message was clear. Although he still supported
the Commission
,
he regarded the House action as "a pretty
decent stimulus." The Governor did not appear to be at ease
in the Commission chambers at any time during the meeting.
I had the distinct impression while watching the Governor in
action, that he was secretly delighted at the action the
House had taken, and was looking forward to a possible re-
duction in state spending if the Commission failed to come
up with a planned alternative to House 6200. It was apparent
that the Commission, especially the gubernatorial appointees,
expected some heartwarming or buoyant message from Governor
King. There was none. The message was very clear. Do some-
thing—or else.
Chairman Boverini had stated when the Governor first
arrived that the Governor would answer no questions. No one
on the Commission tried to challenge that blockade so the
only thing the Commission received was a prepared statement.
67
The Governor did state that he was not even generally
aware of the action of the House. However, he agreed with
and supported the thrust of the House action.
King urged the Commission to forward what they had,
even if it was incomplete. He definitely implied that he
wanted some significant action before the end of this legis-
lative year.
The Governor's appearance was brief, and it was an
embarrassment to the Commission members on two counts.
1. No questions were allowed.
2. The Governor offered a devastating blow to many
members of the Commission by openly endorsing the
action of the House of Representatives.
(Even more devastating, at least to this observer,
was the attitude of some Commission members who indicated
by their words or actions that they not only expected the
action of the House but gave it a covert endorsement.)
Before the Governor arrived at the meeting, most of
the dialogue of the Commission had been directed at focus-
ing on the issue of some sort of positive action, while
some of the dialogue had been reserved for speaking in an
angry fashion about the action of the House in passing
House 6200. Representative Matrango stated that he apolo-
gized to the Commission members for the fact that he and
the other members of the legislature were unable to strike
the outside reorganization language from the budget, but
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does not have to apologize for the manner in which the
House/Commission members conducted themselves. "We fought
the good fight." He implied that the battle might have
been lost, but the war was far from over.
Representative Corazzini wanted the Commission to
know that there was no personal vendetta by the Ways and
Means Committee, and the House was only interested in causing
the Commission to move faster. (Representative Corazzini,
although a member of the Commission, had not supported his
Commission colleagues in a crucial vote on the House floor
during passage of the budget.)
Matrango's reply to Representative Corazzini was
correct and cutting. He coldly informed the Representative
that what he had just informed the Commission about might
very well be completely wrong should the Senate adopt the
same outside language as the House.
After the Governor left the May 8, 1980 meeting, a
great deal of dialogue took place. Secretary Johnson urged
that the Commission trust the Governor, and Arnold Friedman
urged that a massive effort to produce a reasonable plan in
a short time be considered by the Commission. Laura Clausen
stated, "This Commission needs to provide leadership." And,
in strong language. Representative Collins openly alluded to
delay as a pertinent factor to be dealt with, both as a
symbol of the slow pace of the Commission up to the current
point, and as something to be avoided in all future work of
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the Commission.
Finally, on a motion of Arnold Friedman (supported by
a 10 to 5 vote)
, the Commission decided to meet in marathon
session the following weekend.
The Commission members had boldly spurned the idea of
discussing the ramifications of House 6200 at their April
24, 1980 Governance meeting. However, discussed or not,
that document provided the stimulus for this Commission to
stop its procrastinating and agree to channel its energies
into a marathon weekend session. Despite the angry railing
of the Commission members at the Governor's failure to act
quickly on the appointment of members to the Commission and
the angry comments directed at the members of the House Ways
and Means Committee, the fact remained that all of the
Commission's work and data compilation suddenly was coming
up short, and something drastic was going to have to be done.
May 8, 1980 marked a sad day for the Commission—the
Governor paid a contemptuous and brief visit; one of their
own members had deserted their ranks in a House vote; and
the Commission had nothing ready to produce for the Senate
Ways and Means Committee. The most cruel blow was the con-
tinued lack of leadership on the part of those who should
have been giving leadership. The future did not look good.
However, a chance remained, albeit a long one.
Oddly enough, the Honorable John Collins and Dr.
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George Ilazzard were both absent from this meeting. Yet,
only a week later, their input would shape the future of
higher education in Massachusetts
.
Just before the May 3, 1900 meeting of the full Com-
mission, a May 5, 1930 Boston Globe article cited the major
points of the reorganization plan of State Secretary of
Education Charles E. M. Johnson. 67
The plan was vastly different from, and in many in-
stances directly opposite to, the plan of John Finnegan and
the House Ways and Means Committee.
It was an interesting decision making puzzle for the
Governor—whether to consider the proposal put forth by his
appointee, or whether to continue to (allegedly) support the
effort of the legislature.
Time Span III
This section will deal with the Governance subgroup
of May 13, 1980 and the Boston subgroup of May 15, 1980.
As agreed to in the April 24, 1980 meeting, arrange-
ments were made to allow spokespersons of bargaining units
and students to appear at the May 13, 1980 meeting.
(Scheduled to meet in marathon session on the 16th
of May, the Commission was in the position of still being
without a definite plan or proposal while it sat through
the testimony of various people.)
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Representatives of the Massachusetts Teachers Associ-
ation and the American Federation of Teachers (SMU Division)
spoke before the Commission. Also, several students spoke
before the Commission, urging among other things student
retention on governing and advisory boards, a better artic-
ulation policy and flexible programming.
After the presentations, the Commission's Governance
subgroup got down to business, and much discussion took
place on proposed governance structures. Representative
James Collins found himself on the firing line because he
suggested that his proposal for a possible governance
structure be moved by the Commission for discussion. Mayor
John Collins directed some strong doubts on discussing the
proposal at Representative Collins, as did Commission member
Spiller
.
The meeting continued with some semblance of continuity
and agreement marking the last portion of the meeting.
1. It was agreed by consensus that there should be
twenty-one members on the proposed board, and that the
board should approve missions of institutions.
2. It was agreed by the body that no segmental
membership should occur on the board (central)
.
3. There was consensus that a nominating commission
should be formed, and the maker, Iris Holland, pre-
sented the Commission with a detailed set of guide-
lines for such a commission.
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4. The majority of the Commission gave consensus to
Representative Collins's motion. 68
5. It was agreed that the proposed board have the
authority to terminate programs in the public sector.
Finally, it was agreed to individually review the
various proposals discussed during this meeting at the
ke<?inning of Friday's marathon session.
The Boston subgroup met on Thursday, May 15, 1980,
183 days beyond the first meeting of the Commission. Un-
known to the members, the full activity of the majority of
the Commission members would cease within thirty days.
It also marked the first official day that House 6200,
with its outside language on reorganization, was in the hands
of the Senate, in the form of Senate 2200. 6
°
The main thrust of the Boston subgroup had been to
study the Boston schools as a separate entity. That thrust
had been pursued in a diligent manner.
Senator D'/imico read to the subgroup the summary of
the recommendations of the Commission staff, and the input of
faculty, students and college constituencies, and the Com-
mission itself. The amazing thing is that much of the input
from faculty and staff and student bodies dwelled upon the
absolute need to retain the individual campuses within the
current configuration, and thus was in direct opposition to
the recommendations offered in the form of a working paper
by the Boston subgroup and its staff.
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The recommendations of the Boston subgroup presented
by Senator D'Amico included placing all four-year and post-
four-year programs currently in Boston under one University
structure, putting all community colleges within the Boston
area under one structure (and adding a fourth unit to that
consortium, the Community College Without Walls), and found-
ing a core city consortium. In addition the package summa-
rized by Senator D'Amico called for the establishment of a
task force to draw plans to effect these suggested changes
and mergers, and a timetable.
Representative Polaski expressed a need to take a
strong look at these recommendations before any votes were
taken.
The response by Senator D'Amico was that all members
have known about these recommendations, and that he would
honor a legitimate request for thorough perusal, if a time-
table would be followed.
(This meeting was open for discussion only to the sub-
group members.)
Most of the subgroup used the discussion period to
protest the thrust of the recommendations rather than to
support their thrust. Janet Robinson pleaded for better
statistics before she wished to vote on the proposed merger
of UMass/Boston
,
Boston State and the Massachusetts College
of Art. Representative King wanted to know if these propos-
als reflected actual student needs or if they represented,
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instead
,
a pressure group that wants to cut costs.
Senator D'Amico stressed the need for realization
that the recommendations before the subgroup have been
placed there by unbiased groups, and that even though
mergers are mentioned in the recommendation, it is not in-
tended to simply evacuate all current sites.
Senator D'Amico strongly stated the case for all due
speed to be followed in a decision by the Commission, but
he warned that "There are other elements out there." He
stressed that the House and Senate Chairman of the Ways and
Means Committee believe in contraction of the institutions
at the baccalaureate level.
Secretary Johnson commended Senator D'Amico, and en-
treated the efforts of all members to try to understand the
Senator s commitment. He also made a valuable contribution
to the tone of this meeting by seeking an address of the
issues one step at a time.
The meeting became a contest between Senator D'Amico
and the membership. The contest revolved around the issue
of action in this meeting or the issue of no action in this
meeting
.
Slowly the impasse began to erode.
Finally, the ice was broken. The motion was made by
Representative King to vote on the development of a core
city consortium. The motion passed, despite some stated
opposition
.
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Other motions followed dealing with proper facilities
for Roxbury Community College and others establishing a
temporary facility for the Board of Community Colleges, and
a location of Massachusetts College of Art in an urban
center
.
The meeting adjourned some three hours after it
started.
Consensus had been reached on some points of the
Boston report, but only after practically a physical assault
on the subgroup members by the Chairman.
The next day saw the heralded marathon session
scheduled. If the Boston subgroup meeting of May 15 was any
indicator, the session would prove to be very interesting,
indeed.
70Representative Collins had made a motion which was
successfully voted by his colleagues. It remained to be
seen whether the motion, calling for due process relative
to the Commission's report, meant anything of importance to
the Commission.
CHAPTER VI
MARATHON SESSION
May, 1980 was a very important month for the Special
Commission. The meeting of May 8, 1980 was the date of a
visit from the Governor. May 15, 1980 saw the budget come
out of the Senate Ways and Means Committee without any out-
side language on reorganization. May 16 and 17, 1980 saw
a marathon session of the Special Commission take place,
and the Senate and House budgets were sent to a conference
committee in early June after the House in late May refused
to concur with the Senate budget presentation.
This chapter will record the details of the marathon
session of May 16 and 17, 1980.
Day I - May 16, 1980
Senate and gubernatorial appointees present registered
eighty percent attendance, while the House members showed
sixty percent attending. Gubernatorial appointee Howell
still had not come to a meeting, and this day was no ex-
ception. The meeting was the first official one for Judge
John Fox, and served as the last official one for Dr. Singer,
Senator Buell, and Representative Cimino. (May 8, 1980 had
been the last day of attendance for Senator Fonseca.)
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The meeting opened with reports from Dr. Sherry andSenator D'Amico. An agenda had been prepared, but some
confusion arose early in the meeting relative to what
specific course to follow (whether to stay as a full Com-
mission, break into subcommittees, or take some other course)
Arnold Friedman suggested that the members stay as a commit-
tee of the whole, and take input from all members. In spite
of that, shortly afterward. Representative Collins (at 10:55
a.m.) moved that the full Commission participate in a Govern-
ance subgroup meeting. It was not formally voted, but took
place anyway.
Representative Collins directed Janet Slovin to lead
the discussion on the governance issue. Perhaps because of
the heightened sense of pressure from outside, the first
part of the presentation dealing with the possible forms of
governance started off with a high degree of concentration.
However, that state of affairs was a momentary thing, and
soon the process, in my opinion, began to break down.
For approximately the next hour, a variety of issues
was discussed by the Commission members. Commission member
Arnold Friedman suggested a direction to take when he
suggested that the Commission make a structure first, and
then assign powers within the structure. Further direction
was suggested by Senator John Olver when he said "We are
here because of dissatisfaction with the present system.
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Put as much governance as possible at the campus level."
Representative Collins urged his colleagues to con-
sider the establishment of a central board with powers of
budget
,
program and plant, and the power of being the ex-
clusive voice of public higher education before the legis-
lature and the governor. Then Representative Collins
suggested that the segmental boards be given powers by this
central board so that they can function easily on a local
level with central board direction.
That brought about an interesting contest. For the
few minutes, it was Collins vs Collins, as the former
Mayor fought the idea of Representative Collins's motion
being placed before the group for discussion purposes. In-
stead, the former Mayor suggested that several options be
considered. Finally, Representative Iris Holland cleared
the impasse by making a motion that the plan of Representa-
tive Collins be used as a model for discussion. The motion
was approved, and the meeting progressed.
Representative Collins took the opportunity to immedi-
ately launch into a discussion of how the budgets for the
institutions will be formulated, and again discussed the
function of a central board, and then the role of segmental
boards. (Senator John Olver then questioned the need for
segmental boards at all.)
Much discussion again took place about the need for
segments, with Representative Collins putting the case for
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segmental boards as strongly as he could. He cautioned the
Commission that a complete lack of segmental boards would
force all decisions to be made at the top, with no input
from institutions. (it was obvious that most members of
the Commission were reluctant to agree, especially quickly,
with Representative Collins, but found no effective way to
either stifle the Representative or openly fight with him.
Instead many Commission members simply used the method of
raising small issues that were effective blockers even
though none were substantive issues.)
Finally, the topic shifted to another area—budgets
and allocations. Extensive debate occurred about the
functions of a central board in relation to the budget pro
cess, to whom the central board would recommend its budget
proposals, and what the merits of the joint legislative
Education Committee's input into the process of central
board budget proposals would be.
Laura Clausen openly scoffed at any talk of really
changing the allocation process, and referred to the many
friends in the legislature that the colleges have. Other
comments on budgets were advanced by Commissioner Anrig and
Secretary Johnson.
After a relatively unprogressive morning, activities
stopped while the Commission members broke for lunch.
When the Commission convened again, the first move
was to postpone action on any Boston issue until Monday,
00
May 19, 1980. While within this stance of changing gears,
Chairraan Boverini than took the opportunity to tell the
Commission that if this Commission would do something to
produce a piece of legislation, the legislative process
could be followed, and he ventured that even those who have
already proposed a legislative package of reorganization
would be desirous of seeing something positive emanate from
the Commission. (His statement that even those who have
already proposed a legislative package of reorganization
would be pleased to see something come out of the Commission
could not have been made with the slightest bit of certainty
on his part. I feel that it was a statement to justify the
direction that the Commission was taking by holding the
marathon session in the first place.)
Senator Olver offered the thought that the House-
senate Conference Committee could be through with its work in
early June. This caused Chairman Boverini to state that in
the event legislation was agreed upon by the House and Senate
Conference Committee, the Commission could still file a plan
with the Governor, and the Commission's plan could end up in
the outside language of the budget. This suggested mode was
a radical departure for Chairman Boverini to take, because
up to this point, the only course that he had advised and
advocated was one that involved the legislative process.
The chairman then urged faster progress (which was also a
radical departure for him)
.
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The next action occurred very quietly, but was one of
the most significant milestones of the Commission. The
Honorable John Collins proposed a 15-member Public/Indepen-
dent Coordinating Commission which would have broad powers,
and the proposal made no arrangements for segmental boards.
He wished this board to be examined along with the proposal
of Representative Collins. The proposal was made without
fanfare or loud noises, but was to provide the substance of
an actual reorganization move that became reality.
Secretary Johnson diverted the Commission for a short
while by attempting to have the Commission look at the role
of the Executive Office of Education. Executive Director
Richard Hailer probably offered the most concise statements
of his term by stating that the vital link missing in the
Secretary's office was power. Without power, it was in-
ferred, all discussion of the Secretary's office was point-
less, and should not be pursued.
The meeting continued, this time with a discussion of
collective bargaining and its implementation. Basically,
one of the main issues was that of deciding where the best
place was to deal with personnel, collective bargaining and
other important issues. In other words, who is the employer
Representative Collins pushed diligently for the inclu
sion of the segmental boards within the governance structure
Dr. Sherry stated that he felt a consensus approved the
strong central board concept, but he felt from what was said
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that segmental boards were necessary. Both Dr. Sherry and
Representative Collins tried to set the stage to elicit a
consensus vote from the Commission members.
Representative Mullins moved to continue discussion
of the concept of a Board of Governors, but was driven to
intense anger when the subject of institutional autonomy
arose. Representative Mullins jumped in angrily to say
that the whole question of institutional autonomy was
thrown into a cocked hat three or four years ago when the
legislature appropriated money for institutions to hire
faculty members and the money was used for administrators
instead. That, he said was the crux of the situation today
that found the legislature unwilling to let the colleges
and universities have true fiscal autonomy. Although it
was not noted in the official minutes, the motion to con-
tinue discussion of the Board of Governors passed.
Almost immediately afterward, Representative Holland
offered a motion to have the Board of Governors set tuition
policy and that the fees should be established by segments
(or individual institutions). However, the motion was with-
drawn momentarily by consensus.
Chancellor Clausen initiated, with the help of Repre-
sentative Collins, a discussion of programmatic issues.
While the Commission members started to coordinate their
thoughts on this issue Representative Holland called for a
vote on her previous motion regarding tuition policy.
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Thie motion was declared approved by Chairman Boverini,
and the discussion on programmatic issues resumed.
Dr. Sherry
,
who was having one of his most visible
(and audible) meetings this day again tried to establish
consensus among the members regarding programmatic issues
within public institutions as might be ordained by the 3oard
of Governors.
Representative Collins again came to the rescue by
proposing a motion as follows: "The Board of Governors
shall assume present Board of Higher Education authority to
review and approve programs and degrees for public and
private institutions. Further, the Board of Governors shall
have the authority to rescind programs and degrees for public
institutions by a two-thirds vote. Further, the Board of
Governor's programmatic guidelines for public institutions,
including approval/disapproval of missions and preparation
of a master plan, shall be those outlined in Chancellor
Clausen's working paper presented to the Commission; with the
exception that segmental missions shall replace institutional
missions if segmental structure is retained. Definition of
program shall be as presently defined by the Board of Higher
Education." 71 The motion was approved.
After the motion was passed, Dr. Sherry proposed
that because of the shortened time line the Governance sub-
group would work through the night and the first part of
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the day tomorrow, and then present a consensus to the full
Commission on the afternoon of May 17. Commissioner Anriq
and Senator D'Amico both supported Dr. Sherry's proposal.
The thought was formed into a motion, and approval was voted.
The full Commission stood adjourned.
After the Governance subgroup reconvened, many topics
were brought on the table, including affirmative action,
personnel policies, planning, and scholarships".
The following actions are worthy of record.
Representative Collins, indefatigably
,
pursued the
idea of segmental authority to be formed as well as a
central Board of Governors. He asked for the consensus of
the Commission's Governance subgroup relative to whether or
not to favor the general concept of supporting the idea of
segmental authority.
Chancellor Clausen raised the question of possibly
doing away with the idea of segments entirely. But, Commis-
sioner Anrig suggested that segments were absolutely neces-
sary because of the fact that there are thirty institutions,
and one board could not do the job. Senator Olver wondered
about the number of segments that would be needed, and on a
practical basis said that the number is not as important as
the concept of endorsing segmental boards. Arnold Friedman
opted for segmental level governance, also. He agreed with
the form of segmental governance suggested by Representative
Collins (universities and state colleges together, community
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colleges separate)
.
Representative Collins took advantage of the cresting
feeling for segmental governance which appeared to be occur-
ring by reaffirming the logic of the inclusion of segmental
governance. Dr. Sherry came very close to getting a consen-
sus regarding segments immediately after the remarks of
Secretary Johnson, but Dr. Kailer wanted to say a few words
first. This came very close to being a nearly fatal mistake,
and was certainly poor procedure.
Dr. nailer's remarks included glowing praise of Rep-
resentative James Collins for all the hard work that he had
done
.
Approximately nine minutes after Dr. Sherry first
called for a consensus on segments, he called for one again.
He again missed the opportunity, this time giving the floor
to Senator Olver.
Several minutes later, Arnold Friedman said, "Move the
question." Representative Collins then got up and clarified
his motion once again.
Finally
,
the question was moved (after another sixty
seconds of clarification) and it was approved unanimously.
The next question dealt with advisory boards, and the
qualifications of members of same. Dr. Sherry put forward
his recommendations relative to advisory boards, and the
specific recommendations were then discussed. Senator Olver
offered advice to have more than one alumni representative
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on the advisory board, and Secretary Johnson concurred.
The Commission unanimously approved the concept of advisory
boards for those institutions which did not have a board of
trustees on campus. Specific determination of advisory
board makeup would be determined at a later date.
After a very short break, a very touchy subject was
discussed by the Governance subgroup. This subject was the
function of the Office of the Executive Secretary of Educa-
tion. Many oblique references had been made to the Office
of Secretary of Education throughout the past several months.
Now, the mechanism of the Governance subgroup would allow a
close inspection of that system. Secretary Johnson used the
opportunity to point out the various functions of the
Secretary's office. The Secretary also pointed out that the
function of the Secretary has changed since inception, and
these changes have resulted in a stronger and more modern
structure of services.
Commissioner Anrig speculated that there will always
be an Executive Office of Educational Affairs whether this
Commission deems it so or not. This statement led Dr.
Sherry to shift the direction of the Governance subgroup
from a consideration of the function of the Secretary in
general to, instead, a consideration of the role of the
Secretary with the proposed Board of Governors. Further,
the next question was that of whether the Governor (or
specific designee) should sit on the proposed Board of
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Governors
.
If the Secretary had any fears of what the Governance
subgroup felt about the future of the office of the
Secretary, they were allayed by the discussion and expres-
sions of consensus relative to his position on the evening
of Hay 16, 1980 (even though other quarters were not as
charitable)
.
Representative Collins suggested that the proposed
Board of Governors be the sole authority on budget and pro-
grams dealing with the legislature and governor, and to that
end proposed a recommendation to separate the Secretary of
Education from any line authority of budgetary or program-
matic dealings. At the same time. Representative Collins
made a niche for the Secretary in relation to any future
nominating committee that might be formulated to screen
potential members of advisory boards and boards of trustees.
The motion was seconded (by the Secretary of Education) and
then passed. Consensus was then reached (unanimously) that
the Governor or the Secretary of Education would sit on the
Board of Governors.
Several other points were discussed throughout the
remainder of the evening, commencing with a discussion of
enrollment. However, no action was taken on the subject
because of the lack of a specific direction on how enroll-
ment should be treated. Instead, the concept of enrollment
allowed to be included in the subject of lona-ranaewas
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planning. Two additional items, one dealing with budget
and the other with collective bargaining, were put forth by
Representative Collins but the only concrete action taken
was an agreement by the few remaining Commission members
(regular and ex officio) to discuss them on the morning of
May 17th. Adjournment was voted.
The first of two days of marathon session had ended.
Former Mayor John Collins only attended one of the two
sessions, and Dr. George Hazzard would attend neither. How-
ever, the Collins-Hazzard proposal, that would emanate from
this Commission as a minority report, possessed the potential
for massive impact on public higher education.
Day II - May 17, 1980
The meeting of the Governance subgroup resumed. Rep-
resentative Collins summarized the work of the Governance
subgroup to date, and repeated all recommendations relative
to that work. He stated that the proposed Board of Gover-
nors (referred to by the author at various times in this
dissertation as BOG, also) would essentially have the power
of the present Board of Higher Education. The proposed
structure follows.
1. Twenty-one member board (at large)
2. Five-year terms
3. Appointments made through a nominating commission.
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4. BOG would have internal fiscal autonomy.
5. BOG would have final authority on budget prior
to presentation to legislature and governor.
6. BOG would have programmatic powers.
7. BOG would have planning responsibility.
8. BOG would have authority to develop an information
system.
9. BOG would set tuition.
10. BOG will give final approval to capital outlay
recommendations
.
11. BOG would arrange for coordination of financial
aid guidelines.
12. BOG would have the authority to form and imple-
ment policy regarding affirmative action.
13. BOG would oversee segmental boards.
14. Segmental Boards would have specific powers.
(The full text of the Governance subgroup
working paper will be found in Appendix F.)
The various portions of the Governance subgroup work-
ing paper were discussed, refined and voted upon. Details
were interjected for discussion, sometimes approved and
sometimes disapproved or withdrawn.
The subject of budget was discussed, with the central
theme dealing with the Board of Governors receiving suffi-
cient power so that in case an individual segment or insti-
tution attempted to circumvent the Board of Governors by
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going directly to the legislature (or specific members of
the legislature) for increased appropriations, disciplinary
force could be exerted by the BOG on that institution or
segment. (It was a point well taken, because business in
Massachusetts between public higher education and the legis-
lature has been by history overt and covert, with a great
deal of the latter taking place.)
A very worthy idea was advanced by Robert Spiller,
Commission member, who advocated the use of tuition funds
by the institutions which received them, instead of sending
them back to the state. Fellow commissioners Holland and
Anrig concurred with Mr. Spiller, but the matter was never
refined in this meeting in a manner which allowed resolution.
Unfortunately, it was referred to the proposed Board of
Governors for their study.
Arnold Friedman also made a valuable attempt to clarify
a loosely coordinated part of current higher education when
he attempted to have the Commission resolve the issue of
building authorities. He wanted to know why joint efforts
couldn't be combined into a single authority. It was
suggested that any such coordination wait for the results of
the Special Ward Commission now investigating construction
practices in the Commonwealth.
The mission of colleges and universities was dis-
cussed, with consensus reached by the Commission that the
Board of Governors would determine the mission of the seg-
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ments and the institutions within the segments, and the
segments would determine the admissions policies for the
institutions under its control.
Finally, after two days of discussion, Representative
James Collins moved that the Governance report be forwarded
to the full Commission.
The motion passed.
Senator Walter Boverini assumed the chair, and pre-
sided over the quickest action of the day.
Dr. Sherry proposed that the Commission accept and
adopt the report of the Governance subgroup, and a poll of
the membership was the basis of a motion by Representative
Menard.
Both passed, and the meeting was adjourned. The long
weekend was over.
The Sunday Republican of May 18, 1980 reported the
outcome of the meeting in detail, and the headline said
"College Plan Drafted." The newspaper account made it seem
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as though this plan would probably become the final one.
The end result looked impressive, but was far from
complete. I fully agreed with the need for a strong central
board, and felt that the action recommending a twenty-one
member Board of Governors (with no segmental representation
after a transition period) was excellent. But, no definite
plan dealing directly with the issue of segmental governance
was addressed.
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A review of the action taken by the Commission reveals
the following points.
1. The proposed legislative package was broad, but
failed to adequately address the issues of segmental
board governance and tuition payment recognition to
Par^c
-*-Pa '*:ing public colleges and universities.
2. The package made reference to routes of communi-
cation between the Board of Governors and segments,
and between segments and individual institutions,
without really establishing a structure to make sure
that communication took place.
3. Provisions were made to allow for a five-year
master plan, with no provision made that ensured its
formulation
.
4 . A great deal of the package put together by the
Governance subgroup was formed with the direct help
of Commissioner Anrig, Chancellor Clausen and
Secretary Johnson (ex officio members of the Commis-
sion) .
Certainly, the input of the three professionals
was interesting and informative. However, the poten-
tial elimination of two of the above positions brings
me to the opinion that the ex officio members should
have been used as consultants rather than direct
participants
.
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5. The entire package was put together in a partial
vacuum because the legislative members of the Great
and General Court, with the exception of the Commis-
sion members, had given it no promise of support.
The House and Senate leadership was never overtly
contacted in reference to its potential approval of
the proposed legislative package.
6. No attempt was made to seek the support of the
educational community in a giant effort to get the
measure approved.
7. Finally, the package was put together so hurried-
ly, and without all Commission members present at the
final marathon meeting, that the Commission members
themselves did not have ample time to understand it
or to fully extend their support for it.
The final Governance meeting of the Commission's term
had closed, and had produced an avalanche of suggested
structure whose value would be determined within a couple of
weeks
.
In the next chapter, I shall address the output of the
Boston subgroup as well as the final full meeting of the
Special Commission.
CHAPTER VII
THE FINAL STROKE
The Special Commission on reorganization only had a
few short days of existence left as of May 19, 1980. Its
effective life would end on June 11, some twenty-four days
later. A very slow start had handicapped the Commission
because outside forces had moved quickly to establish a
massive strike force, and these forces had maneuvered the
Commission into a retaliatory pattern of action to produce
legislation which was hastily conceived, hurriedly activ-
ated, and imploringly dispatched to the legislature. Com-
mission Chairman Walter Boverini had also filed the minority
report sponsored by Dr. George Hazzard and the Honorable
John Collins.
The thrust of the minority report called for a fifteen-
member central board, allowed for no segmental boards,
established boards of trustees at each individual insti-
tution and provided those boards with strong powers, abol-
ished both the Office of Secretary of Education and the
Board of Higher Education and gave the central board strong
and specific powers.
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Finishing Touches
Thus, on May 19, 1930, the fourth-from-the-last Boston
subgroup meeting was held in an aura of tension.
The atmosphere was a charged one in a general sense.
The final Commonwealth budget for FY '82, along with any
outside language, was going to be reviewed and decided upon
by a Conference Committee of House and Senate members; the
Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee still held
to most of his original thoughts on reorganization of higher
education; the Governor had for all practical purposes denied
his support to the Commission; and a proposal for governance
had been produced by the Commission, but no one on the Com-
mission could be certain that the proposal would turn out to
be anything but a paper exercise.
The May 19, 1980 Boston subgroup meeting would be the
first of a series of meetings of that body to be held in May
and June. 3ecause of outside pressures, the Boston subgroup
found itself racing to finish its deliberations.
The reader will recall that in Chapter IV of this
work I highlighted the prediction of Foster Furcolo that the
Commission may never get around to making final recommenda-
tions. Also, the reader will remember several instances
where the Commission was urged to hurry along. Nov; it was
critical for the Boston subgroup to move quickly and
effectively, and it was doubtful if that objective could be
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reached.
The Chairman, Senator D'Amico, opened the May 19, 1980
Boston subgroup meeting with a review of the previous
meeting's action. His next action was to ask the Boston
subgroup to consider approval of a motion which would offer
protection to any administrator, faculty and professional
and nonprofessional staff at Boston State College who might
be transferred as a result of incorporation to a different
operating authority because of action recommended by the
Commission or any subgroup of the Commission.
The motion was not given quick approval, by any means.
One complicating factor was the interruption of proceedings
by a House roll call, so that the pending vote required the
return of the temporarily absent House members. Another
factor was the very real opposition and/or stubborn re-
sistance on the part of the Commission members to any quick
acceptance of Senator D'Amico's motion as it was presented.
To be specific, Representatives Pokaski and King and Chan-
cellor Hammond were less than happy with Senator D'Amico's
proposal. Their basic unhappiness seemed to stem from a
perception that UMass/Boston had not fulfilled its potential
for people in comparison to Boston State College, and there-
fore Boston State should not be placed under UMass/Boston.
In the face of explicit criticism of his motion
Senator D'Amico momentarily dropped his pleasant manner,
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and stated that all data being discussed had been around for
quite a while, and he implied that criticism was uncalled
for now. He stated, with the help of Dr. Mailer, that all
reasoning was based on demographics and not upon emotions,
and categorized his ideas as being ideas on middle ground.
(Interestingly, he rather testily told the members of the
subgroup that if he had wanted to rush this issue of in-
cor
'P <->I
'a‘tion through, he would have held a marathon session
over the past weekend, but he did not do so because he
thought that that "would have been wrong... very wrong." In
light of the May 16 and 17 marathon just completed, with
its resulting legislative proposals, Senator D'Amico's re-
marks were extremely interesting
.
)
Representative Pokaski proved to be vociferous on the
subject of the proposed incorporation. His main argument
was that the incorporation would/could lead to a disjunction
of the learning process on the part of students affected by
the proposed incorporation. He stated that his only purpose
in offering resistance was to try to ensure protection for
the proposed clients. (This was really the first visible
and audible major input of Representative Pokaski all year.)
A second roll call in the House Chambers caused another
delay in the Boston subgroup proceedings. Senator D'Amico
used the intermission to state that there was no way that
all students now at Boston State could fit at UMass/Boston
,
even though Chairman Finnegan and Chairman Atkins appeared
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to think that it can be done. He also stated that he felt
the Boston subgroup was not ready to address the issue of
actual incorporation or merger.
A great deal of the discussion centered around the
proposed name of the potential college/university
. in a
move to compromise
, Senator D'Amico suggested that the name
Boston State be removed from his motion and instead the
mantle of intended protection should be extended to all
four-year Boston public institutions and their administra-
tors, faculty and professional/nonprofessional employees.
He strongly emphasized that his revised motion only pro-
tected all employees in the event of incorporation, and in
no way even suggested a possible governance structure within
Boston
.
After more discussion, some objective and some sub-
jective, and almost ninety minutes after the motion was first
presented to the assemblage, the Honorable John Fox and
Representative Murray prompted, through adroit statements,
the immediate consideration of the question.
(Another of the causes of the slow progress on Senator
D'Amico's motion was the inability of anyone present to
quickly put together acceptable amendment language
,
and the
inability of anyone to respond with alacrity to the need for
the language of compromise. Certainly, people on the staff
of the Special Commission had the experience and expertise
to work exceptionally well with language. Obviously, their
09
talents were not called upon.)
The motion, now officially made by Representative
Murray (as Senator D'Amico withdrew his motion making ref-
erence to a specific motion), was approved. It was most
interesting to watch Senator D'Amico at work. He literally
bulled his ideas through the subgroup, and spoke from the
chair to every motion as well.
The action of the meeting continued, with much discus-
sion taking place relative to meeting the needs of students,
and the need to provide open access. To that end, it was
^oted that should incorporation of Boston State and UMass/
Eoston take place, these campuses shall constitute the in-
corporated institution. After much debate on principles
governing a consolidated institution between Chancellor
Hammond and Senator D'Amico, two motions were passed which
allowed for the incorporated institution to be an educa-
tionally and administratively integrated system, and com-
mitted the incorporated institution to open access and
quality education. The motions did much to dispel the fears
of some Commission members who hoped that any incorporation
would not lose the unique aspects of the Boston State College
campus
.
As the meeting adjourned, plans were affirmed to meet
the next day.
The Boston subgroup on May 20, 1930 again reviewed
plans for a possible incorporation of at least two insti-
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tutions in the Boston Area. Senator D'Amico's efforts
were focused on location of this institution as well. In
spite of interruptive roll calls, arguments among Commission
members and, surprisingly, a vote against incorporation.
Senator D Amico managed to fight his way to a decision by
the Commission in favor of incorporation of UMass/Boston
and Boston State (but to leave Massachusetts College of Art
by itself) . The only part of the plan that, upon my review
of it almost one year beyond the date of that Boston subgroup
meeting, proved to be neither foresighted nor quick enough
was the provision that legislation affecting and effecting
the proposed incorporation did not have to be written until
September 30, 1980. Sufficient time did not exist, however.
The Boston subgroup met again on Tuesday, May 27, 1980.
It was day 195 of the Commission's term.
The first action was the proposal of a motion by
Representative Pokaski which offered a suggestion that if
evidence arose to indicate that the incorporation of merger
of Boston State College and UMass/Boston was educationally
unsound or administratively not feasible, such incorporation
or merger should not take place. The motion was approved.
It was not surprising that Representative Pokaski offered
this motion because it was evident at the May 19, 1930
Boston subgroup meeting that he was showing a great deal of
reservation regarding the incorporation of UMass/Boston
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and Boston State College. (It should be noted that he is a
graduate of Boston State College.)
Next, Nancy Wylie from the Board of Regional Community
Colleges presented a mass of statistics (both in verbal form
and written form). Ms. Wylie's report was used by the Com-
mission as an indicator of expanded community college need
in the Boston area, and as an indicator of a need for a
community college without walls. She also mentioned coop-
erative education (as had President McKenzie of Massachusetts
Bay Community College)
,
but did not stress this as her main
point. By comparison, with other areas, Ms. Wylie pointed
out the inadequacy of the present Boston community response
to dealing with nontraditional student needs.
After both the completion of Ms. Wylie's formal pre-
sentation and an interrupting House roll call, Senator
D'Amico expounded upon the subject of expanding the com-
munity college system within the greater Boston area.
Senator D'Amico mentioned his interest in expanding the
services, for instance, to the City of Quincy, by converting
its municipally subsidized Junior College to membership in
the community college system. From time to time, Ms. Wylie
responded to questions from the Boston subgroup, but it was
evident that her data was compiled without an emphasis on
precision. Ms. Wylie's own evaluation of her data corrob-
orated this.
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The last part of the meeting dealt with a discussion
of missions of Boston community colleges, the concept of the
College Without Walls, and a discussion of the need to in-
vite the Interim President and members of the Massachusetts
Board of Community Colleges to the next meeting of the
Boston subgroup. A motion was made to do so, and it was
approved.
Day 202 of the Commission's term witnessed the last
meeting of the Boston subgroup. Representatives of the
Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges were
present, including the interim president and four board
members
.
Chairman D'Amico greeted the five representatives of
the MBRCC, and then immediately put forth three motions
which were to provide the basis of discussion during the
meeting. The motions dealt with three specific areas:
1. A proposed expansion of the community college
system in Boston.
2. The expansion shall provide general and career
programs
.
3. The expansion shall be concurrent with an improved
and coordinated delivery of quality educational
services
The motions were put onto the table for discussion.
Chairman Euckley, first to speak, quickly pointed out
that the MBRCC has attempted to provide full services to
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Boston students, but a lack of funding prevented all from
being done which needed to be done. President Buckley
stated that the MBRCC certainly agrees with the Commission's
aim to build a new facility for Roxbury Community College
in the southwest corridor. Again, he referred to the lack
of funding that has been prevalent for the last few years
i
Dr. Muriel Camarra, a member of the Board of Trustees
and Vice-Chairman of the board, spoke on the importance of
providing career and educational services under the aegis
of the full community college, and not under the aegis of
an outreach center. This might be a way to cut down the
presence of anything but the image of quality education.
She stressed that the community college must help to bolster
the image of those who badly need educational services as
well as provide the services. She also spoke in support of
one Boston community college with several campuses, and
proposed only one president for the entire string of Boston
campuses
.
Dr. Camarra ended her testimony by suggesting that
the Special Commission should provide extensive leadership
to the educational community within the Commonwealth.
The presence of the trustees at the meeting undoubt-
edly caused the numerous references to historical perspec-
tives regarding the community college system. Trustee
Robert Simha recounted failure of three gubernatorial admin-
istrations to support an in depth look at the governance
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structure of the community college; he appreciated the
attempt of this commission to elicit information regarding
governance
.
(The day before this meeting, a Conference Committee
formed for the purpose of ruling on the budget was appointed
from the Senate and the House. Outside forces were closing
in, but the tone of this meeting of June 3rd was one of
historical review, and discussion of future governance
alignments. The subject of the discussions betrayed none
of the urgency that should have been foremost upon the
knowledge of formulation of the House and Senate Conference
Committee. This particular reaction to the impending crunch
of potential legislative dictation of reorganization, as
evinced by the testimony of the trustees present, makes one
wonder at how past issues were regarded.)
Trustee Simha made many references to the high quality
of education obtainable through the community colleges, but,
as many others had stated before him, he claimed that the
previous small resources disbursed to the community colleges
had not allowed the community college system to reach its
potential
.
Senator D'Amico cautioned the participating trustees
that all of this conversation could be moot if the legisla-
ture took things into its own hands.
The last part of the meeting was dedicated to a dis-
cussion of Senator D'Amico's original motions. All three
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motions, after minor amendments, were moved and voted. The
meeting then adjourned abruptly, and all further action was
put off until the Commission meeting of June 11, 1980.
Essentially
,
the Boston subgroup had approved in
principle the greater coordination of four-year institu-
tions within the city of Boston, had approved the establish-
ment of a multiple campus community college system within
Boston run by a single president, maintained the unique
status of the Massachusetts College of Art, approved a new
facility for Roxbury, and had addressed several other im-
portant issues.
None of the subgroup work had been formally presented
to either the full Commission or the legislature.
A massive amount of data had been collected. It re-
mained to be seen if anything positive would result.
The Boston subgroup had reached the identical point
in its progress that had been reached by the Governance
subgroup. It had conducted its last meeting.
Import of Disaster
Only eight days remained until the full Commission
meeting of June 11, 1980. But before the Commission could
meet, disaster struck.
The full import of the impending disaster first sur-
faced to the general public in a June 6, 1980 article in
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the Boston Globe . 73 The article referred to Chairman of
the Senate Ways and Means Committee Chester Atkins and his
remarks concerning the budget as a conduit for outside legis-
lation relating to reorganization. Although previously
opposed to including the House reorganization plan in out-
side budget language
,
Atkins allegedly leaned toward a re-
organization plan based on a proposal of Special Commission
members George Hazzard and John Collins.
On the same day, an article in the Springfield, Massa-
chusetts Morning Union that reported Chester Atkins had, in
fact, embraced the Collins-Hazzard model of reorganization
drew the ire of Representative James Collins, also a Special
Commission member. Vowing to vote against the plan, and
stating that it would "spell the end of quality public
higher education in this state," Collins will file remedial
legislation if the plan becomes part of the fiscal year 1981
.
, ^
74budget process.
The June ICth, 1980 edition of the Boston Globe re-
ported that the House and Senate Conference Committee of the
Massachusetts legislature had agreed to forward the reorg-
75
anization package to both Houses.
The newspapers published in Massachusetts on June 11,
1930 told the story. 3oth branches of the legislature had
passed the budget, including the outside language forming
a strong central 3oard of Regents , and the budget was now
forwarded to thG Governor. The Boston Globe editorial of
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that day stated in its headline that the higher education
7 6bill reeked of backroom tactics.
The official roll calls of the Mouse and Senate
showed three members of the Special Commission on Reorgan-
ization voting for the reorganization package, and two mem-
bers not voting. Representatives Corazzini and Pokaski
,
and Senator Olver, voted for the budget, and Senator
Boverini and Representative Matrango (the latter very ill)
did not participate in the vote. The Mouse vote for the
budget and reorganization was 102 yes, 52 no.
The Senate vote for the same was 19 yes, 15 no. In
addition to Senator Boverini, Senate President Bulger and
Senators Amick, Bertonazzi, Lewis and Wetmore were not re-
corded as voting.
A Devastating Experience
A.bout one hundred people were in the audience ror the
Wednesday, June 11, 1980 meeting of the Special Commission
.
The agenda called for subcommittee reports. They were never
given. Instead, in an atmosphere of dejection, the possible
fate of the Commission was discussed.
Chairman Boverini rationalized his action oj. filing
the majority and minority reports into the legislature by
stating that he had never deviated from his intent to
ensure
that everything coining out of the Commission should go
ion
through the whole process of public hearings. However, he
stunned the Commission members and spectators present when
he said, "Lest I deceive you, I am not strongly opposed to
any plan that- was accepted by the legislature. "
It was akin to betrayal. The members sat silent for
several long quiet seconds. The ultimate crash had happened.
First, the Conference Committee and the legislature had
taken the reorganization process right out of the Commis-
sion's hands. Then, three members of the Commission had
voted for the legislative reorganization proposal, and one of
the two Commission members wTho did not participate in the
final vote had attended the opera instead. Nov/, the Com-
mission members were being told that their Chairman was
really not too unhappy about the outcome.
Senator D'Amico stated that he didn't want to take
one further step until the status of the Commission was
clarified. It was evident that the general feeling was that
until the status of the Commission was finalized, it was
foolish to continue with any future plans.
A motion was made to have the Commission members meet
with the Governor, the Speaker of the House, and the Senate
President
.
The members finally agreed upon the following Com-
mission representatives to meet with the three ofncials
cited above: Chairman Walter Boverini , Representative James
Collins, Honorable John Fox, Arnold Friedman, Janet Robinson,
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Dr. Francis Sherry, and Robert Spiller.
lhe major portion of the meeting was given to angry
statements as well as statements that reflected a great deal
of hurt.
Representative King said that the present adminis-
tration has a horrible record on the issue of race. He also
felt that this Commission would be doing a disservice to
many people if it disbanded. His words to the Commission
were, "Don't walk away."
Senator Iris Holland bemoaned the fact that "Nobody
is listening. Why should we work if nobody will listen?"
Representative Mullins urged the Commission not to go
in to see the Governor and legislative leadership unless
it's made clear that this Commission has been betrayed.
About an hour after it had begun, the meeting stopped,
and the Commission effectively did the same.
CHAPTER VIII
SUMMARY: FACT AND SPECULATION
It is very easy to pass judgment, but indescribably
hard to justify the specific judgements made.
I shall attempt here not to make judgments, but to
point out a great number of conditions which affected the
outcome of the Special Commission on Reorganization. Some
Oj- these conditions existed at the time of the Commission's
formation, and some developed during the same time frame as
the Commi s s ion ' s
.
The Special Commission on the Reorganization of Higher
Education was formed under several clouds which boded ill
for its future. The previous Special Commission (referred
to in earlier chapters)
,
had done extremely little during
its brief tenure. Thus, the present Commission had no great
model of success to refer to, but merely an exercise on
paper to research. The present Commission contained a member
who represented (and in fact, literally, headed) the State
College System, and also included, in ex officio status,
the Executive Secretary of Educational Affairs, the Chan-
cellor of the Board of Higher Education, and the Commissioner
of Education. All four persons certainly had specific con-
stituencies and/or agencies to look out for, and one would
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have to assume that all of their work on the Special Com-
mission had at least the inference of self-serving awareness
of their constituencies
,
even if an actual self-serving
course of action did not exist.
Members of the legislature could be considered to
have had special interests as well.
Some other members of the Commission, while not rep-
resenting any particular constituency, certainly did not
give their complete dedication to the Commission's work.
Their attendance record in some cases was guite poor; in
one case
,
one Commission member did not attend even one
meeting
.
Throughout the proceedings of the Special Commission,
a casual observer would have found it almost impossible to
detect a true "focus" of the Commission that had any staying
power. The direction of the Commission never assumed any
solid bent, but seemed to change as the months went by.
Part of the problem could be traced to the thrust of Chair-
man Boverini
,
who exhibited quite a carefree attitude at
first, then became more intent on coming up with something
to show for the Commission's efforts, and finally showed by
his example that politics within the legislature was the
most important factor in his Senate/Commission activities.
Also, part of the problem occurred because of the failure
of the Commission members to agree on a specific course of
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action. The Commission had two separate subgroups oper-
ating at the same time, and although this situation allowed
for diversity
,
the situation also prohibited a unified
direction with a concurrent singular course of action.
^fter all the work of the Special Commission, one
chilling fact demanded to be recognized—the legislature
remained boss. This fact proved to be irrefutable in spite
of the Commission's marathon session of May 16 and 17, 1980.
The attempt at a whirlwind finish for the Commission was
superseded by the action of the legislature in fashioning
its own reorganization package.
Despite the fact that fifteen of the Commission's
members were also members of the legislature, the imposing
force of the remaining 150 House members and 35 Senate mem-
bers enabled the legislature to do what it wanted to do
when it wanted to do it. The thrust of the legislature in
recent years had been to issue criticisms of the Massachu-
setts public higher education system in relation to its
efficiency and to its effectiveness. Furthermore, the
support of the public higher education system in Massachu-
setts by the legislature was far less than it should have
been. With that background, it was relatively easy for
Representative John Finnegan, Chairman of the House Ways
and Means Committee, to engineer a passage of a reorgani-
zation package through the House within the medium of the
House budget. It was later just as easy for the House-
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Senate Conference Committee to agree on a massive change
for public higher education without granting public hear-
ings, or without really consulting the members of the
public higher education constituency.
Other reasons proved to be important ones in a study
of why the Commission failed to reach its goals. The mem-
bers of the various segments openly rejected directions
suggesting consolidation, and most segmental discussions of
reorganization centered on retention of current parochial-
ism. The competition among the public institutions of
higher education that had become a way of life over the
last several years did not cease during the life of the
Special Commission. It seemed to intensify. Each one of the
segments offered at least one plan for reorganization, and
each plan was unique. A general feeling of doom pervaded
the meetings of the Special Commission, and overshadowed
the brief moments of elation that seemed to spring up on
occasion when it seemed the Commission had taken a giant
step forward.
One of the most devastating moments in the life of
the Commission took place on May S, 1980 when Governor
Edward J. King visited the group. His lack of positive
support for the Commission was a very unpleasant thing ior
me to witness, and must have been even more grueling to sit
through for the members of the Commission. Some positive
support by the Governor would have served notice on the
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lsgi slatuirs that ths Commission would, be the vehicle by
which reorganization would come to pass. The lack of such
support left the door wide open for the legislature to work
its will.
Hypothesis
One hypothesis that I feel deserves advancement is
that the very presence and activity of the Special Commis-
sion allowed the legislature to create its own reorganiza-
tion package. The formation of the House reorganization
package, coming at a time when the Special Commission was
failing to make positive progress, allowed a concrete plan
of the legislature to take center stage.
Has the Commission not existed, any legislative
attempt to produce a reorganization package probably would
have been opposed.
The existence of the Commission allowed the plans
sponsored by the legislature to achieve credibility and a
superior stature. Instead of producing a plan of its own
in plenty of time to be pushed through the legislature, the
Commission procrastinated long enough to give the legislature
the opening that it needed.
Observations
After studying the Commission's eight months of work,
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the following observations appear to be valid reasons for
the failure of the Commission to succeed.
1. The Commission did not have strong popular
support. It is probable that the majority of the citizens
of the Commonwealth had no great interest in the workings
of the Commission, and thus offered no great swell of
support for the Commission's efforts. Because of the lack
of clarity relative to the goals of the Commission, it
would have been difficult for the majority of citizens of
the Commonwealth to understand the full import of the
thrust of the Commission anyway.
2. The Commission did not have strong legislative or
gubernatorial support. It was evident from the Governor's
visit to the Commission on May 8, 1980 that the Governor
would rather lose the faith of the Commission than a good
working relationship with the legislature. It was also
apparent that the legislature in general did not evince much
support for the work of the Commission. Beginning with the
passage of the House budget bill containing a suggested
reorganization package, and continuing down to the votes of
the House and Senate on the suggestions of the Budget Con-
ference Committee, the legislature showed that it was boss.
(In his annual address to the legislature given on January
12, 1981, Governor Edward J. King highlighted the accom-
plishment of the reorganization of public higher education
as one of the major benchmarks of his administration.
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Robert L. Turner, writing in the Poston Globe , said that
the speech "included items for which King should take a
subordinate level of credit. These include the higher ed-
ucation reorganization, which would have been impossible
without House Ways and Means Chairman John J. Finnegan,.." 77
3. The Commission did not have strong support from
public higher education. The goals of the segments of
public higher education were not coincidental with those of
the Commission. Although some surface opposition from the
segments was apparent in relation to suggestions from the
Commission for future changes, the majority of opposition
was covert, and was generated in an attempt to keep a rela-
tively comfortable situation current. Most site visits of
the Boston subgroup were greeted with reasons why the current
systems of segmental organization, and their components as
well, should not be changed. Perhaps the leadership in
public higher education only reflected and/or reinforced the
kind of vacuum found in the Commission itself.
4. The Commission did not have the quantity of
strength needed to overcome the massive liabilities cited in
items one, two and three. Arnold Friedman had used the power
of the press to promulgate his feelings on who should carry
out the reorganization of higher education in Massachusetts,
but I'm afraid that the excellently written editorial failed
to stir the populace enough so that the citizens would take
umbrage with the methods employed by the legislature. xhe
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Commission did not have the stature needed to take on the
Governor
,
the legislature, the segments of public higher
education in relation to a cause that failed to engender
popular support as well. The odds of the Commission's
success at meeting its aspirations became more and more poor
as the life of the Commission was extended.
5. The leadership of the Commission was not dynamic.
The tempo of leadership shifted several times during the
life of the Commission. Although the leadership of the two
subgroups showed sporadic life, the efforts of the two
leaders (Senator D'Amico and Dr. Sherry) were not enough to
counteract the lack of dynamism overall. Part of the reason
for difficulty in maintaining positive progress of the Com-
mission through its leadership stemmed from the dynamics of
the individual members of the Commission. Even more important
than the dynamics exhibited individually was the timing of
same. For instance. Representative Pokaski did not say or do
too much for most of the life of the Commission, but became
a potent force to deal with, and raised formidable obstacles
to swift completion of Boston subgroup action, during the
last days of the Commission. Representative William Mullins
launched many fiery invectives during the course of the
Commission's deliberations at the ineptitude of the trustees
who ran the various institutions. Each meeting found at
least one or two of the members dominating the proceedings
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with their own particular mode of action.
Another reason for the lack of forthright leadership
was the fact that quite a few meetings were spent in sifting
through material that should have been distributed to the
Commission in more succinct form. When material has to be
literally waded through while a Commission is meeting in
regular session, one can see that forward progress will be
jeopardized.
6. Finally, the culmination of the Commission's work
came too late, was too hastily conceived, had no direct
support of the legislature and was not put together in a
cohesive and attractive package. Because there was very
little reason for the legislature to even consider adoption
of the Commission's offering, the inevitable happened—the
Commission's attempt at creating a package of reorganization
failed. The legislature prevailed.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
Reprinted from the Springfield (Ma.) Daily News
,
August 13, 1979
A. A. Michelson
"Laws Hidden Inside Budget"
The general impression is that when the Legislature
adopts a budget for the coming year it is simply approving
a $5.5 billion appropriation to meet the needs of state and
local governments.
But there's much more to it. The multi-billion appro-
priation is only Section 2 of a 118-page document that in-
cludes 73 sections.
The last 71 sections are in prose, not in arith-
metical figures. It is called the "outside section" of the
budget and over the years it has been the source of much
mischief
.
Many state administrators today, for instance, who
enjoy life tenure without ever having to subject themselves
to a Civil Service test, are the beneficiaries of the out-
side section.
Many Jobs Added
Jobs used to be added in the outside section to
agencies in wholesale lots, the recipients of the jobs
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having been previously selected by legislators and the
appointing authorities.
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Today the outside section is less oriented to person-
alities than to policy. But even so it often reflects the
feelings and prejudices of legislative leaders.
It is also used to catch up on some questionable
practices the Ways and Means Committee had run into in its
review of proposed appropriations submitted by executive
agencies
.
Section 49, for instance, inveighs against the muni-
ficence of public higher education boards.
Late last year, for instance, presidents of state
colleges were granted pay raises of $5,000 or more. The
increases represented substantially more than the raises
given other high-paid administrators of state government
whose increases were geared to the percentage increase
accorded all state workers following formal collective
bargaining negotiations.
Sets Pay Ceiling
So Section 49 says any state employe (sic) whose
salary is $30,000 a year or more may not be paid any more
than they were getting July 1, 1977, plus whatever
has been
allowed since than as a result of collective
bargaining.
Section 41 allows legislators their regular
expense
allowance when the Legislature is not in session
so long as
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they are on "legislative business."
Section 40 appropriates $50,000 for the Special Com-
mission on Performing Arts. This is over and above Section
2 appropriations of $2.3 million for the State Council on
Arts and Humanities.
The Special Commission, it should be noted, is a pet
project of Representative John J. Finnegan, D-Boston, chair-
man of the House Ways and Means Committee and Senate President
William M. Bulger, D-Boston.
Section 39 is aimed largely at mental health adminis-
trators. It decrees that no state official can enter into
consent decrees without have (sic) the necessary funds to
back up the costs of such a decree.
Closed State Hospitals
Last year mental health administrators signed consent
decrees, virtually closing up state mental hospitals. There
is a financial problem now as to how the released patients
from those hospitals are going to be cared for in community
facilities
.
Section 29 orders the Department of Public Welfare to
get a second medical opinion in all elective surgical cases
for welfare recipients. This obviously reflects the feeling
that too much questionable surgery has been performed.
A similar section was inserted directing the Depart-
ment of Public Welfare to require that drug prescriptions
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for welfare patients be filled by the generic name of the
drug, "wherever possible." Drugs by their generic name cost
one-third or more less than drugs by their brand names.
But the section that is farthest out in the outside
section is the one which calls for the state government of
Massachusetts to boycott croods manufactured by J.P. Stevens
and Company, Inc., the giant textile firm which has thumbed
its corporate nose at the National Labor Relations Board and
the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers' Union for the
past five years.
No Stevens Purchases
"No funds appropriated in this act," Section 54, de-
clares, "shall be used by state institution, agency, commis-
sion or department for the purchase of goods manufactured
by J.P. Stevens, Inc."
It is the handiwork of Sen. Chester D. Atkins, D-Con-
cord
,
chairman of the Senate Ways and Means Committee. He
was responding obviously to labor leaders and to the state s
liberal constituency.
It's an extremely unusual tack. It could be tnat a
majority in Massachusetts would be in favor of the Atkins
boycott. It could be that it has great merit.
Stevens is an outfit that has been charged with unfair
labor practices, encouraging illegal police
surveillance,
and violating civil rights of workers and
organizers.
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Prompts Film Story
The company's labor practices has prompted Hollywood
to produce (sic) film, Norma Rae" which depicts the trials
and tribulations of a Southern woman trying to rally her co-
workers against the company, and it has already grossed $10
million.
Nevertheless , Section 54 has its disquieting aspects
,
too. For all its philosophical merits, it is (sic) bad kind
of precedent.
The new lav/ was never given a hearing. It was never
debated on the floor of the House or Senate. It's a very
serious controversial matter enacted in the dark.
And if a boycott of a company that may be unpopular
in Massachusetts can become law through one man's
prejudices
today, it can also be directed in the future against
a
company by a legislative leader that doesn’t have
Chet Atkins
(sic) social consciousness.
APPENDIX B
MEMBERS OF SPECIAL COMMISSION
Commission Members (Gubernatorial Appointments)
Name Appointed Withdrew
James M. Howell 10/12/79
Wayne Budd 10/12/79 12/79
Robert Spiller 10/12/79
Arnold Friedman 10/12/79
George Hazzard 10/12/79
Dorothy Singer 10/12/79
Erancis Sherry 10/12/79
James Hammond 10/12/79
John Collins 10/12/79
Foster Furcolo 10/12/79 4/80
Janet Robinson 1/29/80
John Fox 5/9/80
Commission Members (Senate)
Walter J. Boverini
Robert C. Buell
Gerard D'Amico
Mary L. Fonseca
John W. Olver
Commission Members (House
)
Salvatore P. Cimino
James G. Collins
Leo R. Corazzini
Iris K. Holland
Melvin H. King
Frank J. Matrango
Joan M. Menard
William D. Mullins
Mary J . Murray
Daniel F. Pokaski
Commission Members (ex officio)
Gregory Anrig Commissioner of Education
Laura Clausen Chancellor, Board of Higher Education
Charles Johnson Secretary of Education
Michael Daly Deputy Commissioner of Education
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APPENDIX C
TRUSTEE POSITION PAPER ON REORGANIZATION
Reorganization of Public Higher Education
(Voted by the Board at its August 29, 1979 meeting.)
The Board of Trustees believes it is of utmost impor-
tance to the Commonwealth to maintain its statewide Univer-
sity, encompassing interrelated campuses at Amherst, Boston
and Worcester and field, experiment, research and public
service facilities throughout Massachusetts. The statewide
University should continue to provide an integrated program
of teaching, research and public service of the highest
quality to the people of the Commonwealth. No plan of re-
organization should be adopted which severs and isolates
the Boston urban campus and its natural student constitu-
encies from the benefits of the quality and prestigious
programs offered by our statewide University.
Any reorganization of higher education in Massa-
chusetts should clearly reflect the unique mission and
responsibility of the statewide University, and should be
based on a careful examination of the needs of the Common-
wealth .
The relationship of any other existing institutions
or segments to the statewide University should be carefully
evaluated on the basis of their compatibility with those
needs
.
8/29/79
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Principles for Statewide Organization Doc.T 79-085
of Public Hiaher Education
- i' „
The organisation of public higher education in Massa-
chusetts must reflect the needs of the Commonwealth. The
following principles should guide any reorganization:
1 . Massachusetts must have a sy stem o f public higher
education of high quality, offering a range of programs
diverse enough to meet the educational needs of its
citizens .
Massachusetts must recognize public higher education
primarily as an investment which will yield economic
and social benefits. It must insist on quality at all
levels of public higher education; the public should
not be asked to support programs of poor quality.
2 . Within the whole education system, the mission, __
role, and function of each segmen t or category of
institut ions must be more clearly different iated
.
Clearer understanding of each segment
1
s role in a
system will reduce wasteful redundancy of programs
and will clarify the choice the student makes in
seeking admission to a program. Admission criteria
and practices should reflect the differing missions
and programs of the segments.
3
.
Massachu ^-i-*-^ need s a statewide public_ Univers i ty
with primary responsibility for JJJperal
professional and professional _educatlon_at_the under
-
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graduate and graduate levels , and for research,
technical assistance and public service throughout
the Commonwealth .
Such an institution should be characterized in all its
parts by quality faculty, as signified by a high per-
centage of terminal degrees and by active engagement
in research and professional activity as well as in
instruction. It should be able to meet all criteria
appropriate for national recognition by accreditinq
bodies, including having a core of full-time faculty
in all programs.
In addition to a residential campus and to the
historic functions of the land-grant institution, it
should have one or more urban campuses which provide
access to commuting students and serve as a focal
point for the delivery of public service and tech-
nical assistance to the public and private institu-
tions and agencies concentrated in metropolitan areas.
Programs on all campuses should meet the crite-
ria of quality faculty and eligibility for national
recognition, and should extend across the range Oi
activities appropriate for a University.
4 . Massachusetts needs a network of community
colleges with primary responsibility for two-year
proarams
, providing ready access for local popula-
tions and responsive to local needs.
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iiie community colleges provide two-year career-
oriented technical programs
,
as well as programs pro-
viding entry points into higher education, with
adequate opportunities for transfer into senior
institutions
.
5 . In evaluating the continuing need for a third
category of institutions, Massachusetts should con-
sider defining more specifically the mission of its
state colleges giving special attention to their
offering of four-year career-oriented programs.
Such programs should be closely related to the
areas of specialization of the community colleges in
nearby areas, providing appropriate and logical ex-
tension of those programs in fields where career-
oriented training beyond the Associate degree level
is warranted. Close organizational coordination be-
tween community and state colleges is required for
both regular degree and continuing education programs.
The range of programs offered by state colleges
should avoid redundancy, at least on a regional basis.
6 . In reviewing the mission of its state colleges
and their relationship to the community colleges ,
Massachusetts should carefully consider whether its
educational needs require continued maintenance of the
10 state and 15 community colleges.
Such a review might indicate the feasibility of
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reducing the number of institutions by merger or
consolidation
.
7 . The review of institutions should be carried out
region by region
,
and modifications of the present
configuration should vary from one regional situation
to another .
In each case it is important to take into account
the existence of other institutions in close geo-
graphic proximity.
8 . In recognizing the clearer differentiation of
missions among the segments of higher education,
Massachusetts must develop a governance structure
which provides effective coordination, yet allows
each segment and institution flexibility to respond
to local needs and build on local strengths.
The structure should be sufficiently consolidated
and inclusive to allow coordination and implementation
of plans, but should maintain the functional differen-
tiation of the segments and permit substantial dele-
gation of authority to the local level. The structure
should reflect major differences of mission and scope
in varying types of institutions.
9
.
Massachusetts must maintain and strengthen a state
wide coordinating mechanism, but this agency
—
shoul d
not be responsible for the governance of any insti^
tution or segment.
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The coordinating agency is not an advocate for
any institution, segment, or sector. It should be
responsible for providing the Governor and the General
Court with reliable data and analyses for all insti-
tutions; should review all requests from public insti-
tutions for operating and capital outlay appropriations;
should develop and update a statewide master plan de-
fining scope and missions of all institutions; should
review existing programs and new proposals for consist-
ency with this plan; and should exercise the Colle-
giate Authority.
10 . Both the governance and the coordination of high-
er education should be the responsibility of lay
boards of high quality .
Boards should have full authority to appoint the
chief executives and officers of their segment, insti-
tution, or agency.
Governing boards should have the fullest possible
authority for management of resources appropriated for
their segments and institutions, including the ability
to shift resources among institutions. They should
have full authority to establish tuition levels appro-
priate to their institutions.
11 . in addition to the formal coordinating bodies,
Massachusetts should provide ways for enhancing coqp^
eration on a regional basis, including the private as
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well as the public sector .
Consortia such as Five Colleges Inc. and the
Worcester Consortium for Higher Education should be
encouraged, and the potential usefulness of regional
planning councils should be explored.
1 2 . Massachusetts must strive to provide adequate
access to higher education by offering a diversity of
academic programs, by maintaining reasonable tuition
levels supplemented by state tuition aid, and by
eliminating both tangible and intangible barriers to
equal access opportunity, for all qualified persons.
An adequate system of student financial assis-
tance must be developed which takes into account
opportunities for Massachusetts students in the
private as well as the public sector.
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A Possible Framework for the Reorganization Doc.T 79-086
Public Higher Education in the Boston Area
A. INTRODUCTION
Realignment of public higher education in the Boston
area should be consistent with, and part of, a statewide
reorganization. And it should be designed to meet the real
educational requirements of the Commonwealth.
Massachusetts clearly needs:
— A strong community college network offering two-
year programs which provide both career-oriented tech-
nical training and opportunities for transfer into
four-year institutions. These programs should be
closely responsive to community needs, and their costs
and admissions standards should be designed to insure
maximum access;
— A statewide University, combining residential and
urban commuter campuses, emphasizing four-year under-
graduate and graduate programs in professional fields
and the liberal arts, and providing the research,
technical assistance, and public service programs
which are the historical responsibilities of state
universities. Admissions criteria and costs should
be consistent with the nature of its program.
Less clearly definable is the overall relationship of
the state colleges to the general pattern of higher education.
Many of them provide important opportunities for access to
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education
,
but the total scope, mission, and number
of colleges needs careful examination.
The review should be carried out case-by-case, taking
into consideration the offerings and strengths of other
institutions in the geographical area of each college.
Modifications in the present system of state colleges
should vary, we believe, from one region to another.
B . The Boston Area
Nowhere is the need for reviewing the continuing and
unmet educational needs more pressing than in the Boston
metropolitan area. As the state's major urban area, Boston
needs the full range of educational programs, from two-year
career-oriented technical training to advanced professional
education
.
Because its population includes large numbers both of
educationally disadvantaged students and adults seeking
part-time and in-service education, Boston especially needs
diversity in the cost, time and mode of delivery, and
location of its programs.
And the metropolitan area is likely to have increasing
need for the technical assistance and public service capa-
bilities of a University.
Because we can expect diminishing, or at best stable,
financial support for the educational needs of the Boston
we need a clear assessment of the essential programs and
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institutions which can result in reconfigurations that
eleminate wasteful duplication and cut back programs of
lesser priority.
Presently
,
there is clearly considerable overlap
among existing institutions and programs. The Commonwealth
now supports two institutions in Boston—UMass/Boston and
Boston State College—which offer a wide range of bacca-
laureate programs, although the total number of uoper
division (junior and senior level) students in the two
institutions combined is only about 4,500 full-time equiv-
alent ( FTE ) . These programs and students could be much more
effectively accommodated in a single institution.
Furthermore, Boston State and UMass/Boston now provide
a first point of entry for many students who are seeking
higher education but who have not yet developed well-defined
interests and goals. A large proportion of these students
would probably be better served initially by a strengthened
community college.
In view of this, we suggest a new configuration of
institutions as follows:
1) The University of Massachusetts Center at Boston ,
combining the current University of Massachusetts
at Boston and the Massachusetts College of Art
(maintained as a distinct unit) , and assuming
resoonsibility for : all four year undergraduate
programs in the liberal arts and in pre-profes-
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sional and professional areas deemed needed in the
Boston area; all graduate programs; continuing
education programs at an upper division under-
graduate and graduate level; and lower division
programs in those areas not available at the
community colleges.
2) An expanded Community College network, primarily
responsible for two year career oriented, technical
programs, but offering, as well, transfer programs
as needed. The Community Colleges would also pro-
vide continuing education at a lower division
level as appropriate.
The principle (sic) objectives of this configuration would be
to provide educational services better suited to
the needs of the Boston area and at less cost;
to expand and strengthen the community colleges
as the institutions most suitable to provide low
cost access to the majority of entering students;
to create a single institution which will accom-
modate the limited number of upper division and
graduate students now in the system, doing so at
the highest available level of quality;
to bring the Massachusetts College of Art into the
University of Massachusetts, thereby enhancing the
capacity of both to provide advanced and graduate
education while preserving the distinct identity
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and character of the College of Art;
to continue the development of the University of
Massachusetts at Boston as a comprehensive univer-
sity center capable of providing undergraduate and
graduate education of the highest quality as well
as the public service, research, and technical
assistance functions to the statewide University
system;
to make possible a more effective and coordinated
approach to the educational needs of adult and
other non-traditional students;
to provide clearer differentiation of mission, and
therefore clearer choices for the benefit of
potential students;
to create a simpler institutional structure more
adaptable to future changes in enrollment; and
to accomplish these objectives at less cost than
continuing the current expenditures for existing
institutions
.
This framework can form the basis of further discus-
sion of feasability (sic) and exploration of alternative
approaches with all concerned.
APPENDIX D
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF REORGANIZATION PROPOSALS
NOTE: All listed are plans forwarded to the Special
Commission on the Reorganization of Higher Education
and do not reflect official recommendations/actions
of the Special Commission. All are on file in Room
15
,
State House, Boston, MA.
1973 H. 6160 (Sargent/Cronin) Board of Post-Secondary
Education Five Regional
Boards
1976 H. 4623 (Dukakis) Board of Overseers-charged
with developing one of three
alternative structures.
1976 H. 4482 (Matrango/BHE
)
Restructured BIIE - 11
gubernatorial appointees.
1976 S . 1371 (Harrington) Board of Trustees of the
Colleges and Universities
of Massachusetts. Councils
with limited authority at
campus level.
1977 H.5756 (Dukakis) Board of Overseers -
Segmental Boards intact.
1977 Working draft
(Dukakis/Parks)
Strengthened Coordinating
Agency - Regional Boards.
1977 H.619 (Gannett) Restructured BHE; increased
powers
1978 Sloan Commission Massachusetts Higher Ed.
Commission Segments intact.
1979 McGuire Restructured BHE; strength-
ened - 6 Segments (City U.
of Boston)
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1979 UMass. Board Coordinating Board -
Restructured Boston
Institutions -Expanded
Community Colleges.
1979 Kermit Morrissey Single Board of Regents
1980 Community Colleges Coordinating Board -
Restructure Community
College Board.
1980 MBRCC (Boston) Two-Tiered governance
system
1980 Foster Furcolo Post-Secondary Education
Commission Three Segmental
Boards - Advisory Boards
at each college.
1980 SMU Coordinating Board,
strengthened - Segments
retain autonomy.
1980 H. 6262 (Finnegan) Board of Public Regents
supplants Secretary of Ed;
BHE; State College Board
and Community College Board
Universities retain autonomy
All administrative staffs
reduced.
1980 Secretary of Ed. Expanded Exec. Ofc. of Ed.
(with a planning council of
15 members and a program
council of 11 members) re-
places BHE.
1980 BHE Expanded BHE (with planning
,
budget and program authority)
replaces Exec. Ofc. of
Education
.
Note : apitalization and punctuation have been
duplicated
<actly from the original paper obtained from the
Decial Commission.
APPENDIX E
GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE GOALS
DETERMINE ;
-Role and function of Secretary's Office
-Role and function of a Central Board
-Powers a Central Board should exercise
-Structure of the systems: Community College,
state college, university
-Function of segmental or institutional boards
-Constitution of boards
WORK PLAN FOR COMMITTEE :
-Review major reorganization plans
-Analyze plans as they address major functions:
budget, planning, programs, etc.
-Evaluate effectiveness of present system as it
addresses major functions. Identify problem
areas
-Invite authors of reorganization plans to meet
with subcommittee
-Meet with constituency groups, perhaps on
different campuses throughout the state
-Review systems of other states
-Submit report and recommendations to full Commission
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APPENDIX F
GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE REPORT
PREAMBLE
In order to foster the development of well-planned,
administered and coordinated institutions and policies of
public higher education, to improve the quality and extend
the benefits of education, to promote diversity of educa-
tional opportunity, and to encourage an economical and effec-
tive use of the public and private resources of the Common-
wealth, the structure of public higher education within the
Commonwealth is hereby redefined in accordance with the
provisions of this act.
Board of Governors
Membership: 21 members
-20 Gubernatorial appointees and the Governor or his/
her Secretary of Education
-a Nominating Commission shall recommend to the
Governor appointees to the Board
-Chairman elected by B.O.G.
-Members serve at large
-Staggered 5-year terms: limit 2 terms
-No member to receive remuneration from public/private
higher education
-Transition membership (staggered appointments - no
dual service)
:
U Mass - 2
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State Colleges - 2
Community Colleges - 2
SMU - 1
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U Lowell - 1
BHE - 3
-Chief Executive appointed by B.O.G. (? vote)
-B.O.G. has authority to transfer funds among its own
agency accounts
Powers of Board of Governors
Mission
:
-approve/disapprove missions
Budget-Recommendations and Presentation:
-approve and authorize segmental maintenance and
capital outlay requests on FY 2-year cycle in accord-
ance with format set by B.O.G.
-present one consolidated budget by segment and
institutions to Governor and House and Senate Ways
and Means
Transferability of Funds
-authority to transfer funds among its own agency
accounts
-budgets appropriated by segments and institutions.
B.O.G. has authority to transfer funds among institu-
tions and segments in accordance with format set by
notification and approval of House andB.O.G. upon
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Senate Ways and Means and Administration and Finance
-segments have the authority to transfer funds among
the institutions within their purview in accordance
with format set by B.O.G. and with B.O.G. approval
-institutions have authority to transfer funds among
accounts in accordance with format set by B.O.G. with
(segmental approval? advisory board approval?) and
with notification to segment and B.O.G.
Collective Bargaining:
An Office of Employee Service will be established
within the Board of Governors to
-coordinate collective bargaining efforts of
segments
-provide expertise and resources to the segments
-relate to the Office of Employee Relations in
matters of wage guidelines
Tuition Policy:
-authority to establish tuitions for public higher
education institutions
Capital Outlay:
—review capital outlay requests from segments
—
recommend to legislature and governor canitax outlav
expenditures. -Jo capital outlay appropriation shall
be made v;ithout B.O.G. approval.
-B.O.G. may initiate capital requests
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-(Await additional information from. Ward Commission's
recommendations on construction throughout the state)
Program
:
-establish, review, approve and amend by majority vote
programs and degrees for public higher education
-discontinue programs and degrees for public higher
education by a 2/3 vote
-continue to exercise authority presently vested in
Board of Higher Education for private institutions
-(Definition of program shall be as presently defined
by Board of Higher Education)
Planning
:
-establish 5-year master plan (including capital
outlay planning) to present annually to legislature
and governor.
-present to legislature and governor 2-year progress
reports
Information
:
-authority to collect and analyze data for purposes of
establishing a management information system
Scholarship
:
—Commission requests staff to research best possible
approach to tie together all financial aid programs,
including HELP, and to determine the efficacy of an
autonomous agency
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Affirmative Action:
-authority to establish affirmative action policy and
take such actions as may be necessary to assure con-
formance with that policy
Collaboration
:
-promote public/private collaboration and coordination
-promote intersegmental coordination and resolve con-
flicts over policy or operation
Segmental Boards
Segmental Boards would have the following responsi-
bilities: (The number and make-up of boards would be deter-
mined at a later date.)
-establish mission statement for approval by B.O.G.
-establish and submit to B.O.G. for authorization
maintenance and capital outlay budgets
-have the authority to transfer funds among the
institutions within their purview in accordance with
format set by B.O.G. and with B.O.G. approval
-conduct collective bargaining: serve as employer
-submit 5-year plan in accordance with mission state-
ment for approval by B.O.G.
-submit 2-year progress report to B.O.G.
-determine academic policies
-establish personnel policies with authority to appoint,
transfer, dismiss, promote and award tenure
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-be the employer for the chief executive officer of
segments and of chancellors of each institution
-set admissions policy in order to accomplish missions
assigned to segments by B.O.G.
-set fees
-establish policies concerning physical plants
-establish affirmative action policies
Trustees of segmental boards will be nominated through
the process established by a Nominating Commission.
Advisory Boards
Advisory Boards will be established at each insti-
tution with the following responsibilities:
-review institutional budget recommendations
-be represented by its chairman on the search committee
for the chancellor of its institution
-serve to encourage linkage between community and
institution
Secretary of Education
The governance of higher education shall rest
with lay
boards, as proposed by the Special Commission.
Any statutory
provisions for the Secretary of Education which
conflict with
this principle should be deleted.
The role of the Secretary of Education
should be deter-
mined by the Governor, to whom he is an
adviser, provided
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that such role shall not be in conflict with the statutory
authority of the lay boards.
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APPENDIX H
MASSACHUSETTS HOUSE BILL 6200
is important to address the issue of what was con-
tained in House 6200 and the ramifications of its final
passage in the House.
House 6200, dated April 9, 1980, contained multiple
sections dealing with a reorganization plan for higher edu-
cation. This language was part of the budget, but was
"outside of" the line items of the budget, hence the term
outside language.
The reorganization language called for a combining of
the state and community colleges, and the formation of a
15-member board of public regents to govern those 25 insti-
tutions. The University of Massachusetts, Lowell and
Southeastern Massachusetts would be governed by individual
boards of trustees.
Concurrently, the language of 6200, pending approval,
would abolish the Board of Higher Education, the Secretary
of Educational Affairs, and the state and community college
trustees
.
None of this language appeared in the Governor's
budget message. House I.
In fact. House I called for the amount of $305,524.00
in the line item 7000-0100 labeled Executive Office of
171
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6200 only allowed $76,202.00 for the same line item.
Also, the line items 7101-0001 labeled Administration
Division of State Colleges received $1,054,140.00 in the
Governor's budget message of House I, but only a recommend-
ation of $262,935.00 in the budget message of the House
6200.
Making it even more confusing is that during the pro-
ceedings of the House when House 6200 was being considered
for passage, it is alleged that the Governor and members of
his staff lobbied actively for passage of the outside lan-
guage of House 6200, even though parts of it were diametri-
cally opposed to House I.
During the debate prior to the eventual passage of
House 6200, an attempt was made to repeal Sections 56-69
by Representative James Collins.
The attempt failed, 83-67, partly because of the
massive dedication to passage of the Chairman of the House
Ways and Means Committee, partly because of the opposition
to Representative Collins's move by the leadership of the
House of Representatives, and partly because of the less
than unanimous support of the House legislative members of
the Special Commission. Representative Leo Corazzini, a
House member of the Special Commission, voted against the
prooosal to remove the outside language pertaining to public
higher education from House 6200.
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The fight was certainly bitter on the House floor when
the amendment was being debated. One of the suprising
opponents of the amendment was Barney Frank, supposedly an
avowed friend of education.
me subject of the House Bill 6200 would come up again
among educators and others for the next couple of months.
The Commission had worked for several months with the
threat of a legislative reorganization package always just
about to happen. Now it had happened .
However, the relief of it happening at last was over-
shadowed by the new fear that now that the House version of
reorganization had passed, the Senate version (or Conference
Committee version) could be worse.
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